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Abstract 
 
The cyber attacks on Estonia in late April and the early weeks of May 2007 
significantly crippled the country, preventing it from performing banking, 
communications, news reporting, government transactions and command and control 
activities.   Estonia is considered a “Wired Society”, much like the United States.  Both 
countries rely on the cyberspace infrastructure economically and politically.  Estonia 
sought assistance outside the country to recover from and to address the attacks. The 
cyber attacks on Estonia focused world-wide attention on the effects that cyberspace 
attacks could have on countries.  If a cyber attack of national significance occurred 
against the United States, what would the United States do?  The Department of Defense 
is responsible for protecting the nation and its geographical boundaries from attack, but 
what is DoD’s role for securing the United States’ cyberspace?  Research was conducted 
by studying national orders, strategies, policies plans, and doctrine to determine DoD’s 
role for securing the United States’ cyberspace.  Research revealed that DoD is assigned 
the lead role as Sector Specific Agency (SSA) for the Defense Industrial Base (DIB).  As 
the lead SSA for the DIB, DoD’s role for securing the United States’ cyberspace is to 
identify, assess, and improve risk management of the critical infrastructure within the 
DIB.  Our nation’s defense and military strength rely on the DoD which in turn relies on 
the DIB to enable DoD to perform its mission.  Participation by the DIB is on a voluntary 
basis, with DIB participants making the risk management calls and implementing the 
strategies that best fit their needs, which may not serve national security objectives. 
iv 
 Acknowledgments 
 
I would like to express my sincere appreciation to my faculty advisor, Dr. Robert Mills, 
for his support and guidance during the course of my thesis effort.  His shared wisdom, 
advice, patience and insight were greatly appreciated.  I want to thank Mr. Robert 
Kaufman for sponsoring my research.   I want to thank my National Air and Space 
Intelligence Center (NASIC) managers (Mr. Mokas, Captain Grafton, Major Carey, 
Major Fletcher, Mr. O’Brien and Colonel Kross) for endorsing me in the opportunity to 
attend AFIT full-time to complete an advanced degree in Cyber Operations.  I want to 
thank my co-workers who have supported me in this endeavor by shouldering my work 
while I was away at school full-time.  I want to thank Lieutenant Colonel Bailey, whose 
advice and encouragement kept me going through the darkest of times.  I want to thank 
my husband for his patience and for understanding and supporting me in my educational 
goals as a non-traditional student.  I want to thank my step-daughter, son-in-law and 
grandkids for understanding my limited involvement with their activities over the last 18 
months.  I want to thank my family and friends for their understanding and support, 
especially my mom and my mother-in-law, and my friends and neighbors.  
 
 
       Jane J. Griffin 
 
 
 
 
v 
 Table of Contents 
Page 
Abstract .............................................................................................................................. iv 
Acknowledgments................................................................................................................v 
Table of Contents ............................................................................................................... vi 
List of Figures .................................................................................................................. viii 
List of Tables ..................................................................................................................... ix 
I.  Introduction .....................................................................................................................1 
1.1.  Motivation for Research ..................................................................................1 
1.2.  Problem Statement ...........................................................................................4 
1.3.  Research Questions ..........................................................................................5 
1.4.  Scope ................................................................................................................6 
1.5.  Methodology ....................................................................................................6 
1.6.  Limitations .......................................................................................................7 
1.7.  Research Outline ..............................................................................................7 
II. Literature review .............................................................................................................9 
2.1.  Introduction ......................................................................................................9 
2.2.  National Security .............................................................................................9 
2.3.  National Orders, Strategies, Directives and Plans .........................................10 
2.4.  Summary ........................................................................................................17 
III. Methodology ................................................................................................................18 
3.1.  Chapter Overview ..........................................................................................18 
3.2.  Department of Defense (DoD) .......................................................................19 
3.3.  Department of Homeland Security (DHS) .....................................................22 
3.4.  Literature Review Content Analysis ..............................................................25 
vi 
 vii 
3.5.  Investigative Questions ..................................................................................42 
3.6.  Summary ........................................................................................................45 
IV. Results and Analysis ....................................................................................................47 
4.1.  Chapter Overview ..........................................................................................47 
4.2.  GAO report on DOD Risk Management Approach for DIB Analysis ..........47 
4.3.      DHS Cyber Storm Exercise Analysis .............................................................51 
4.4.      Summary.........................................................................................................54 
V.  Conclusion ...................................................................................................................56 
5.1.      Discussion.......................................................................................................56 
5.2.      Recommendations for Future Research ..........................................................59 
5.3.      Conclusion ......................................................................................................61 
Appendix A. Acronym List ................................................................................................63 
Appendix B. Terms and Definitions ..................................................................................66 
Bibliography ......................................................................................................................77 
Vita ………………………………………………………………………………………86 
 List of Figures 
Page 
Figure 1. DoD Chain of Command and Control ............................................................... 20 
Figure 2: Combatant Commanders Geographic Areas of Responsibility (AORs) ........... 21 
Figure 3: DHS Org Chart .................................................................................................. 23 
Figure 4: DHS National Protection and Programs Organization Chart ............................ 24 
Figure 5: Cyberspace Roles and Responsibilities ............................................................. 27 
Figure 6: United States’ Protection Challenge .................................................................. 28 
Figure 7: NIPP CI/KR Protection Methodology Model ................................................... 31 
Figure 8: United States’ Critical Infrastructure/Key Resources Sector ............................ 32 
Figure 9: Foundations for DoD Strategy for Homeland Defense and Civil Support ........ 37 
Figure 10: DoD Objectives and Core Capabilities for Protecting the US from Attack .... 38 
viii 
 List of Tables 
Page 
Table 1: Internet Statistics for Estonia and United States ................................................... 2 
Table 2: DIB Segments and Sub-segments ....................................................................... 33 
Table 3: DIB Commodities ............................................................................................... 34 
Table 4: Summary of DOD’s Efforts in Identifying and Assessing Critical DIB Assets . 36 
Table 5: Assessments Planned during Fiscal Years 2007 to 2012.................................... 36 
ix 
  
 
 
DOD ROLE FOR SECURING UNITED STATES CYBERSPACE 
 
 
 
 
I.  Introduction 
 
1.1. Motivation for Research 
For several weeks in May 2007, it was widely reported in the news that cyber 
attacks were being committed against Estonia by creating a distributed denial-of-service 
(DDOS) on Estonia’s national infrastructure (government, financial, and commercial 
websites) [1].  The attackers of Estonia’s infrastructure used Botnets to perform the 
DDOS.  Botnets are networks of remote-controlled zombie computers.  The owners/users 
of these zombie computers are not aware that their computers are being used for these 
types of activities [2].   Estonia first realized it was under attack when government and 
banking transactions ceased to work globally within the country.  One of Estonia’s largest 
banks reported losses of at least $1 million dollars during the cyber attacks [3]. 
Estonia's defense minister, Mr. Jaak Aaviksoo, reported that more than 1 million 
computers worldwide had been used over several weeks to attack Estonian government 
and business Web site.  At first, it appeared that Russia was behind the cyber attacks as 
several of the attacking Internet Protocol (IP) addresses were publicly identified as 
Russian government IP addresses, but later analysis did not bear this out.  Estonia 
requested assistance from NATO, as these attacks could have been seen as an act of war, 
even though it was clear who was behind the attacks.   
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 NATO sent several cyber experts to Estonia to assist in determining where the 
attacks originated and to further strengthen the cyber security procedures already in 
place.  Analysis of these attacks categorized them as “cyber riots”.   Eventually, the 
attacks were traced back to an Estonian student, and seven months later in January 2008, 
the 20-year-old Estonian hacker was fined approximately $1,620.00 for the cyber attack 
[4].   The scales of justice do not seem very equal when comparing the fine to the amount 
of losses incurred by just one of Estonia’s banks. 
Now, substitute the United States for Estonia.  The U.S. relies on information 
technologies from the simplest task of making a phone call using voice over internet 
protocol (VOIP) to deploying a weapon against an adversary.  Today's interconnected 
systems and networks allow us to operate around the world through cyberspace within a 
matter of seconds exposing our infrastructure to cyberspace threats affecting our national 
security, public safety and personal privacy.  
Table 1 provides the number of internet users and country population for Estonia 
[5] and the United States as of 30 November 2007 [6].   
Table 1: Internet Statistics for Estonia and United States 
(Source: Internet World Stats Usage and Population Statistics) 
Country Population # Internet Users % Users 
United States (US) 301,139,947 215,088,545 71.4 
Estonia (EE) 1,315,912 760,000 57.8 
 
Comparing the number of cyber users between the two countries, the United 
States has nearly 300 times as many internet users as Estonia.  While direct comparisons 
are difficult to make, it is clear that a similar type of cyber attack against the United 
States could affect significantly more people, impacting the safety, morale, and security 
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 of our American citizens as well as our nation’s economy. If the United States 
experienced cyber attacks of the same intensity as Estonia’s, what role would DoD have 
in securing the United States’ cyberspace from cyber attacks? How could we be sure who 
is attacking in a timely matter and the intent of the attack?  In conventional warfare one 
can ascertain who performed the attack by examining the delivery method and materials 
in a timely matter.  A cyber attack is more difficult to attribute, and the differences 
between warlike and criminal acts are blurred. 
The threats still exist for an adversary to physically attack the United States, but a 
skilled cyberspace state or non-state adversary could strike at the heart of America’s 
homeland remotely and anonymously.  Our reliance on the power and capabilities of  
Information Technology (IT), which may contain vulnerabilities exploitable by an 
adversary, could ultimately be our weakness, our Achilles Heel.  
“Today, the cyber economy is the economy. And I don't mean the dot coms. I mean 
virtually every vital service -- water supply, transportation, energy, banking and 
finance, telecommunications, public health. All of these rely upon computers and the 
fiber-optic lines, switches and routers that connect them. Corrupt those networks, 
and you disrupt the nation. It is a paradox of our times: the very technology that 
makes our economy so dynamic and our military forces so dominating -- also makes 
us more vulnerable. …. And everyday it is driven home to us that the threat is not just 
theoretical....Protecting our nation's critical infrastructure can only be done in 
concert with private industry” [7]. 
 
The United States relies on cyberspace for the simplest of day-to-day activities to 
the most complex activities.  Our national security, public health and safety, economic 
well-being, and way of life depend on the critical infrastructures and key resources being 
available to us in cyberspace.  Our government and military rely on cyberspace to 
perform its missions.  Our commerce relies on cyberspace to conduct its activities. 
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 The typical citizen relies on cyberspace for day-to-day activities.  With the 
advances in technology over the last twenty years, people can now perform video 
teleconferencing (VTC), make phone calls around the world and connect to local wireless 
networks available in various cities around the world.  Our nation’s citizens rely on 
cyberspace to pay bills, purchase merchandise, groceries, and fuel, buy and sell stocks, 
file government taxes online, manage financial accounts (savings, checking, loan 
application requests and repayment plans), participate in government elections, and 
communicate via email and Voice over IP (VOIP).  Global Positioning Systems (GPS) 
provide highly accurate position, velocity, and time navigation information to users via 
cyberspace.  Cyberspace supports transportation on the ground, in the air, on the water, 
under the water, and in space.  Cyberspace is used to provide information to consumers, 
filter and provide the safe water that we consume on a daily basis, provide comfortable 
environments to work in, and defend our country against adversaries.   
“Cyber is the United States’ Center of Gravity--the hub of all power and 
movement, upon which everything else depends. It is the Nation’s neural 
network” [8].      
 
1.2. Problem Statement  
This research attempts to determine what role the DoD performs in securing the 
United States’ homeland cyberspace.  This paper explores the strategies and plans put in 
place to prevent a cyberspace attack from occurring against the United States’ critical 
infrastructures and affecting the national security and safety.  The research examines the 
government’s chain of command to determine if clear lines of command are in place so 
that if a cyberspace attack occurred against the nation’s critical infrastructures, someone 
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 would be in charge and be able to direct actions from the “big picture” perspective, as 
well as provide information sharing with all the key players.  The nation does not want a 
repeat of government failure to take action when a national disaster occurs such as the 
Hurricane Katrina in 2005. 
Congress investigated the disastrous Hurricane Katrina incident that occurred in 
August 2005 and released a report titled “A Failure of Initiative” which detailed the lack 
of actions by top level government managers to address a national crisis.   That report 
sited numerous problem areas throughout the federal and state governments.  One major 
finding was that “Communications between DOD and DHS, and in particularly FEMA, 
during the immediate week after landfall, reflect a lack of information sharing, near 
panic, and problems with process” [9]. 
1.3. Research Questions 
This research will first explore the DoD’s role for securing the United States’ 
homeland.  This will be done by analyzing the strategic and national policies and legal 
authorities.  Next the research answers the question of what is DoD’s role for securing the 
United States’ cyberspace.  To answer this question, the research uses the following 
investigative questions:  
• What is DoD’s role for securing the United States homeland critical infrastructure 
from cyber attack?  
 
• What support can DoD provide to civil authorities to respond and recover from 
cyber attack?   
 
• Can/should the National Guard and reserve members’ roles be expanded to 
support cyberspace roles and functions?   
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 The research first studies the laws, national strategies, policies, plans and 
guidelines that are in place for DoD to secure the United States.  The research then 
explores DoD’s role for securing the United States’ cyberspace, how DoD can work with 
other agencies to respond to and recover from cyberspace attacks, and the feasibility of 
expanding the National Guard and reserve members roles for performing cyberspace 
functions. 
1.4. Scope 
The scope for this thesis is centered on the DoD role, without special regard to a 
specific branch of service.  Branches of service may be mentioned, but only to support a 
point being made in the research paper.  The research also focuses on national cyberspace 
defense and not offensive or expeditionary operations. 
1.5. Methodology 
The research will consist of referencing the types of documents, web resources, 
and training materials associated with securing the United States’ cyberspace.  A content 
analysis and a critical review of published national and strategic policies and guidance 
directives will be performed for tracing DoD’s responsibilities to defend the United 
States homeland and secure the United States’ cyberspace.  This research will attempt to 
determine if adequate plans are in place for DoD to secure the United States’ cyberspace. 
Based on the findings, it will make recommendations to prevent a “cyberspace Hurricane 
Katrina” from occurring.   
Throughout the research effort, many definitions of cyberspace were found.   This 
research uses the official DoD definition: “Cyberspace is a domain characterized by the 
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 use of electronics and the electromagnetic spectrum to store, modify, and exchange data 
via networked systems and associated infrastructures” [10].  
1.6. Limitations 
The time limit for completing this thesis was based on a six-month window out of 
an 18 month program.    Additional limitations for this thesis are, that during the course 
of this research and before being published, new laws, guidelines, policies may be put 
into place, causing some of the research and conclusions to be overcome by events.  The 
information presented in this thesis is publicly available; however, due to the nature of 
the Cyber Storm exercise, some of the exercise results may be withheld from the public 
due to national security.  
1.7. Research Outline 
Chapter I provides the background for this thesis.  It covers the need for this type 
of research, the problem statement, the research objectives, the scope, methodology, and 
limitations of this research.   
Chapter II provides a literature review of national laws, strategies, directives and 
plans guiding the DoD and the Department of Homeland Security (DHS) for defending 
the United States’ cyberspace.  
Chapter III examines more closely the literature providing guidance to the DoD 
and DHS organizations.  It explores the research and investigative questions to determine 
if documentation exists to address DoD’s role for securing the United States’ cyberspace.  
If the documentation exists, this chapter provides the answers to the research and 
investigative questions. 
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Chapter IV examines the answers to the research and investigative questions for 
strengths and weaknesses and provides a gap analysis with recommendations for 
addressing perceived deficiencies. 
Chapter V provides the conclusions based on the research findings and includes 
recommendations for future research.  
Appendix A provides an Acronym List, and Appendix B provides a list of Terms 
and Definitions.  
 
 
  
II. Literature review 
 
2.1. Introduction 
This chapter summarizes the literature reviewed to answer the research and 
investigative questions.  The methodology used to identify the documents for literature 
review consisted of researching areas that related to cyberspace, DoD roles, homeland 
defense and security, and critical infrastructures.  It is important to understand what 
national security is before delving into the national orders, strategies, directives and 
plans. This chapter defines national security and then discusses the national orders, 
strategies, directives and plans pertinent to the problem of securing and defending the 
nation’s cyberspace information infrastructure.  It provides a summary of the purpose for 
each order, strategy, directive and plan, detailing who generated the document, when it 
was generated, and why it was generated.  These documents will be reviewed and 
discussed in more detail in Chapter III, as needed.  A summary of the literature review is 
provided at the end of this chapter. 
2.2. National Security  
“If the attacking side secretly...launches a sneak attack against its financial markets, 
then after causing a financial crisis, buries a computer virus and hack detachment in 
the opponent's computer system in the advance, while at the same time carrying out a 
network attack against the enemy so that the civilian electricity network, traffic 
dispatching network, financial transaction network, telephone communications 
network, and mass media network are completely paralyzed, this will cause the 
enemy nation to fall into social panic, street riots, and a political crisis” [11]. 
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 National security is about protecting the sovereignty of our nation, defending our 
borders, and promoting and embracing our American way of life.  This includes 
protecting our nation from attack whether from other nation states or non-nation states 
and defeating our adversaries, if required and protecting our way of life.  Our nation 
leverages its instruments of national power--Diplomatic, Information, Military and 
Economic (DIME) to wield influence and promote our national security interests. 
  The National Security Act of 1947 provided a comprehensive program for the 
security of the United States by establishing the National Security Council; Secretary of 
Defense; a National Military Establishment; Departments of the Army, Navy, and Air 
Force; and coordination of the activities of the National Military Establishment with other 
departments and agencies of the Government concerned with the national security [12]. 
 The following sections examine the national strategies, directives, plans and 
orders that provide guidance to our great nation, concentrating on critical infrastructure 
and cyberspace.  
2.3. National Orders, Strategies, Directives and Plans 
Following the terrorist attacks on the United States on 11 September 2001 (9/11), 
executive orders, national strategies, directives and plans were issued for protecting the 
nation’s homeland and critical infrastructure.  This section presents these orders, 
strategies, directives and plans in the chronological timeline that they were issued in 
order to assist the reader in following the history of securing the nation’s homeland and 
its cyberspace infrastructure.  Executive orders and national strategies provide the 
10 
 guidance for leveraging our nation’s instruments of national power (DIME).  The 
National Security Strategy (NSS) provides the overarching strategy for guiding our 
nation.  The National Defense Strategy (NDS) defines strategic objectives to support the 
NSS and provides the high-level guidance for development of the National Military 
Strategy (NMS).  The NMS defines national military objectives based on the NSS, NDS, 
and the current security environment.  DoD Directives provide guidance to DoD 
organizations for performing their assigned duties and responsibilities.  National plans 
provide guidance for securing and responding to incidents of national significance. 
An outline of these orders, national strategies, directives and plans are listed 
below. 
Executive Order 13231 - Critical Infrastructure Protection in the Information Age  
Executive Order (EO) 13231- Critical Infrastructure Protection in the Information 
Age, issued by the White House on Oct 16, 2001, provided the policy for protecting the 
information systems for the nations’ critical infrastructures [13].  This order updated the 
United States Code Title 50 – War and National Defense.  USC Title 50 created the 
National Defense Council for coordination of industries and resources for the nation’s 
security and well-being [14].    
National Strategy for Homeland Security 
The National Strategy for Homeland Security, issued by the White House in July 
2002, is the first Homeland Security document to be released [15].  It complemented the 
National Security Strategy of the United States by addressing terrorism within the United 
11 
 States.  The National Strategy for Homeland Security establishes the foundation for 
organizing the nation’s efforts to secure the US homeland from terrorist attack.  It also 
provides initial guidance on how to achieve this goal.   
Homeland Security Act of 2002 
 The Homeland Security Act of 2002, issued on 25 November 2002, established 
the Department of Homeland Security (DHS) and defined its mission [16].    United 
States Code (USC) Title 6 – Domestic Security is also referred to as the Homeland 
Security Act 2002.   
Homeland Security Presidential Directive/HSPD-5 
HSPD-5, Management of Domestic Incidents, issued by the White House on 28 
February 2003, assigned the Secretary of Defense Homeland Security as the lead federal 
official for coordinating resources and responding to homeland incidents generated by 
terrorist attacks, major disasters and other types of emergencies [17].  HSPD-5 
established the National Incident Management Systems (NIMS) to provide a consistent 
nationwide approach for Federal, state and local governments to work together to prepare 
for and respond to and recover from domestic incidents.    
National Strategy to Secure Cyberspace 
The National Strategy to Secure Cyberspace, issued in February 2003 by the 
White House [18], is an implementing component of the National Strategy for Homeland 
Security [19] and is complemented by The National Strategy for the Physical Protection 
of Critical Infrastructures and Key Assets [20].   The National Strategy to Secure 
12 
 Cyberspace encourages Americans to secure the portions of cyberspace that they own, 
operate, control, or interact with.  The government cannot do it alone.   
National Strategy for the Physical Protection of CI and Key Assets 
The National Strategy for the Physical Protection of Critical Infrastructures (CI)  
and Key Assets, issued in February 2003 by the White House, identifies the national 
goals and outlines guiding principles to secure the nation’s critical infrastructures and key 
assets [20].  This strategy complements the National Strategy to Secure Cyberspace. 
Homeland Security Presidential Directive/HSPD-7 
HSPD-7, Critical Infrastructure Identification, Prioritization, and Protection, 
issued 17 December 2003, established national policy for identifying and prioritizing US 
critical infrastructures and key resources and protecting them [21].  HSPD-7 identified 
the roles and responsibilities for Secretary of Department of Homeland Security and also 
documented DoD as the sector-specific lead agency for the Defense Industrial Base.  
The National Military Strategy of the United States of America 
The National Military Strategy (NMS) of the United States of America, issued in 
2004, derives its objectives from the NSS, NDS and the current security environment 
[22].  The current security environment consists of four types of challenges: (1) 
Traditional: state employs recognized military capabilities; (2) Irregular: Use of 
unconventional methods to counter stronger opponent; (3) Catastrophic: Use of Weapons 
of Mass Destruction or producing WMD-like effects; and (4) Disruptive: Use of 
technology to affect Critical Infrastructure and Key Resources (CI/KR): for example – a 
13 
 cyberspace attack.  NMS states its three military objects as: (1) Protect the United States 
against external attacks and aggression; (2) Prevent conflict and surprise attack; and (3) 
Prevail against adversaries.  Preventing conflict and surprise cyber attacks address the 
disruptive challenges of our nation’s current security environment. 
National Response Plan 
The National Response Plan, issued by DHS in December 2004, establishes a 
comprehensive, national, all-hazards approach to domestic incident management [23].  It 
includes prevention, preparedness, response and recovery guidance, for responding to 
attacks, disasters, and other emergencies of national significance.  Incident annexes are 
provided for responding to Biological, Catastrophic, Cyber, Food and Agriculture, 
Nuclear and Radiological, Oil and Hazardous Materials, and Terrorism Incident Law 
Enforcement and Investigation events.  The Cyber Incident Annex provides the 
framework for responding to cyber incidents of national significance. 
The National Defense Strategy of the United States of America  
The National Defense Strategy (NDS) of the United States of America, issued by 
DoD in March 2005, states the Department of Defense’s four strategic objectives for 
supporting the United States’ National Security Strategy as:  (1) Secure the United States 
from Direct Attack; (2) Secure Strategic Access and Retain Global Freedom of Action; 
(3) Strengthen Alliances and Partnerships; and (4) Establish Favorable Security 
Conditions [24].  The NDS provides high-level guidance for development of the National 
Military Strategy.  Establishing favorable security conditions includes securing 
14 
 cyberspace, and making it less vulnerable to exploits by adversaries.  The NDS advocates 
using an active layered defense in protecting the United States’ national security. 
Strategy for Homeland Defense and Civil Support 
The Strategy for Homeland Defense and Civil Support, issued by DoD in June 
2005, supports guidance from the National Security Strategy, the National Defense 
Strategy, and the National Strategy for Homeland Security [25].  It performs the 
following activities to secure the United States from direct attack: 
• Lead – At National Command Authority (NCA) direction, execute military 
missions to deter, dissuade, and defeat attacks on our nation, population, defense 
critical infrastructure 
 
• Support – At NCA direction, provide support to civil authorities 
• Enable – Share expertise and technology with military & civilian entities 
DoD Directive 3020.40 Defense Critical Infrastructure Program (DCIP) 
DoD Directive 3020.40, Defense Critical Infrastructure Program, issued in August 
2005, implements Homeland Security Presidential Directive 7 (HSPD-7) to function as 
the Sector Specific Agency (SSA) for the Defense Industrial Base (DIB) [26].  The 
Director of the Defense Contract Management Agency (DCMA) is assigned the lead 
agent role for the DIB. The DoD, as the lead SSA for the DIB critical infrastructure 
sector, has the responsibilities to collaborate with all relevant departments, agencies, and 
private sector entities, conduct or facilitate vulnerability assessments of the sector, and 
encourage risk management strategies to protect and mitigate attack effects. 
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 The National Security Strategy of the United States of America 
“There was a time when two oceans seemed to provide protection from problems 
in other lands, leaving America to lead by example alone. That time has long 
since passed. America cannot know peace, security, and prosperity by retreating 
from the world. America must lead by deed as well as by example. This is how 
we plan to lead, and this is the legacy we will leave to those who follow” [27:49].  
   
 
The National Security Strategy (NSS) of the United States of America is updated 
as needed and was last released in March 2006 by the White House.  It emphasizes 
making the world a safer better place, promoting activities for developing relationships 
with allies, partners, and friends, and documents the need for securing and against 
preventing attacks on the United States, and to work with other organizations and nations 
for providing a more secure environment for all to flourish and prosper [27:1-3].   
National Infrastructure Protection Plan 
DHS published the National Infrastructure Protection Plan (NIPP) in 2006 based 
on the requirements in the Homeland Security Presidential Directive 7 (HSPD-7) [28].  
The NIPP provides the unifying structure for integrating CI/KR protection into a single 
national program.  HSPD-7 designated various Sector Specific Agencies (SSAs) for DHS 
to coordinate with for the nation’s Critical Infrastructure and Key Resources (CIKR).   
Defense Industrial Base: Critical Infrastructure and Key Resources SSP  
The Defense Industrial Base: Critical Infrastructure and Key Resources Sector 
Specific Plan, issued by DoD and DHS in May 2007, implements HSPD-7 direction for 
DoD to serve as lead Sector Specific Agency (SSA) for the Defense Industrial Base 
(DIB) [29].  As the lead SSA for the DIB, the DoD works closely with the DIB members 
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 to identify critical assets, assess risk, and improve the sector’s risk management posture.  
This SSP defines the DIB as 
“The Department of Defense, U.S. Government, and private sector worldwide 
industrial complex with capabilities to perform research and develop, produce, 
deliver, and maintain military weapon systems, subsystems, components, or parts to 
meet military requirements necessary to fulfill the National Military Strategy (NMS). 
The DIB is comprised of hundreds of thousands of industrial sites. The 
preponderance of the DIB is privately owned and comprised of businesses of all 
sizes” [29:5]. 
2.4. Summary 
This chapter provided a literature review and introduction of the national orders, 
strategies, directives, and plans that apply to securing and defending the United States 
critical infrastructures in cyberspace.   
Chapter III examines the research methodology used to answer our research and 
investigative questions and delves more deeply into those documents that provide the 
answers to our research and investigative questions. 
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 III. Methodology 
3.1. Chapter Overview 
The purpose of this chapter is to focus on the way in which the research was 
conducted. The literature review served as the foundation for this thesis, highlighting the 
key documents studied.   
The research methodology consisted of the following activities: 
• Reviewed the DoD and DHS organization structure 
• Identified literature relevant to this research by performing searches of 
these related terms: “cyberspace, cyber war, cyber attack, homeland 
security, homeland defense, United States cyberspace, DoD role”, which 
led to perform further document searches on “national strategy, national 
security, national defense, and defense industrial base” 
 
•  Reduced the amount of identified relevant literature for this research to 
the subset identified in Chapter II 
 
• Applied knowledge gained from AFIT graduate studies 
• Traced DoD guidance for securing United States cyberspace through the 
national orders, strategies, directives and plans.   
 
• Use identified literature to answer research and investigative questions 
• Introduced reports on nation’s cyberspace exercise and DoD status of its 
risk management methodology for DIB critical infrastructure 
 
 
This research examines the DoD’s chain of command and discusses the high-level 
DoD components.  The research then examines the DHS’s organization structure, with 
regards to protection of the nation’s cyberspace infrastructure.  Next the research utilizes 
the research and investigative questions to examine the documents identified in the 
literature review in Chapter II.  The research explores the research question regarding the 
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 DoD’s role for securing the United States’ cyberspace, using the following investigative 
questions: 
• What is DoD’s role for securing the United States’ homeland from cyber 
attack?  
 
• What support can DoD provide to civil authorities to respond and recover 
from cyber attack?   
 
• Can/should the National Guard and reserve roles be expanded to support 
cyberspace roles and functions?   
 
3.2. Department of Defense (DoD) 
DoD’s role for defending the United States is two-fold: 1) Provide the military 
forces to deter war; and 2) Protect the security of the United States. The literature review 
in Chapter II described the national security, defense and military strategies that provide 
the guidance to DoD for performing its mission.  Traditionally, the DoD has achieved its 
mission by force or threat of force (deterrence) and projecting its power abroad.  
The DoD’s mission and functions are documented in Joint Publication 1 (JP1) 
Doctrine for the Armed Forces of the United States and are listed below: 
“As prescribed by higher authority, the DOD will maintain and employ Armed 
Forces to fulfill the following aims: defend the Constitution of the United States 
(U.S.) against all enemies, foreign and domestic; ensure, by timely and effective 
military action, the security of the United States, its possessions and areas vital to its 
interest; and uphold and advance the national policies and interests of the United 
States.  These functions are performed under the authority, direction, and control of 
the Secretary of Defense, who in turn reports to the President of the U.S., our 
Commander-in-Chief” [30].        
 
The President of the United States enforces the nation’s laws and serves as 
Commander-in-Chief over the Armed Forces.  The President and Secretary of Defense 
(referred to as National Command Authority (NCA) [30]) exercise authority and control 
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 of the Armed Forces through two distinct branches of the chain of command as illustrated 
in Figure 1.  
 
Figure 1. DoD Chain of Command and Control 
[30:II-5] 
In Figure 1, DoD Chain of Command and Control, the primary chain of command 
and control branch runs from the President through the Secretary of Defense (SECDEF) 
to the Unified Commands.  The Unified Commands conduct military operations (in 
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 peace-time and conflict) to support national objectives.  There are a total of nine Unified 
Commands (UCs): 
• United States Central Command (USCENTCOM) * 
• United States Europe Command (USEUCOM) * 
• United States Pacific Command (USPACOM) * 
• United States Northern Command (USNORTHCOM) * 
• United States Southern Command (USSOUTHCOM) * 
• United States Strategic Command (USSTRATCOM) 
• United States Transportation Command (USTRANSCOM) 
• United States Special Operations Command (USSOCOM) 
• United States Joint Forces Command (USJFCOM)  
 
The five UCs listed above with “*” following their names have geographic Areas 
of Responsibility (AORs).   The remaining UCs provide capabilities on a global scale or 
based on function.  Figure 2 depicts these AORs.  
 
Figure 2: Combatant Commanders Geographic Areas of Responsibility (AORs)  
[31] 
The second chain of command and control shown in Figure 1 is administrative in 
nature and is used for purposes other than operational direction of forces assigned to the 
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 combatant commands.  This branch runs from the President through the SECDEF to the 
Secretaries of the Military Departments.  
The President is the ultimate authority as commander-in-chief of the armed 
forces.  The Secretary of Defense tasks the Military Departments, Unified Commands, 
and the Chairman of Joint Chiefs of Staff for conducting the nation’s military operations 
and executing national defense strategies.  
The Military Departments (Air Force, Army and Navy) operate under the 
authority, direction, and control of the Secretary of each department. The primary 
mission of the Military Departments is to organize, train and equip forces to provide 
capabilities when needed in support of Combatant Commander (CCDR) requirements.  
The Secretaries exercise authority through their respective Service Chiefs over Service 
forces not directly assigned to the Unified Commands.  The Service Chiefs, except as 
otherwise prescribed by law, perform their duties under the authority, direction, and 
control of the Secretaries of the respective Military Departments to whom they are 
directly responsible.  Service Chiefs are senior military advisers to the National 
Command Authority (NCA) for matters pertaining to their respective service. 
3.3. Department of Homeland Security (DHS) 
The Department of Homeland Security’s role is to lead the United States in 
unifying internal efforts to secure the vast national network of organizations and 
institutions involved in contributing to the economic well being and security of our 
country.  Figure 3 illustrates the DHS organization chart. 
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Figure 3: DHS Org Chart  
[32:1] 
The DHS is responsible for protecting the nation’s “critical infrastructure” and 
key resources.  The term “critical infrastructure”  is defined in the Uniting and 
Strengthening America by Providing Appropriate Tools Required to Intercept and 
Obstruct Terrorism (USA PATRIOT Act) Act of 2001, Public Law 107-56, 115 Stat. 
272, dated 26 October 2001,  as “systems and assets, whether physical or virtual, so vital 
to the United States that the incapacity or destruction of such systems and assets would 
have a debilitating impact on security, national economic security, national public health 
or safety, or any combination of those matters” [33].   
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 There are 25 offices reporting to Secretary of Homeland Security that are 
responsible for performing homeland security activities.  Cyberspace security homeland 
defense activities are located in the National Protection & Programs Directorate (NPPD).  
The NPPD’s mission is to promote the DHS’s risk-reduction mission.   Figure 4 
illustrates the NPPD organization chart.  The Infrastructure Protection office is 
responsible for ensuring that the nation’s critical infrastructure and key resources are 
protected.    The DoD SSA for the Defense Industrial Base works with the Infrastructure 
Protection Assistant Secretary under the National Protection & Programs office. 
 
Figure 4: DHS National Protection and Programs Organization Chart 
[32:11] 
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 3.4. Literature Review Content Analysis 
This section investigates the documents described in Chapter II in more detail. 
The research and investigative questions are used to guide the research.   
 What is DoD’s role for securing the United States’ cyberspace? 
Examining the documents provided in the literature review, the research reveals 
that EO 13231 provides policy for protecting the information systems of our nation’s 
critical infrastructures [13].  The National Strategy for Homeland Security provides 
guidance for securing the nation by integrating the capabilities of local, Tribal, State, and 
Federal governments with the private and non-profit sectors, in order to secure the critical 
infrastructures and key resources in the land, water, air, space, and cyber domains [15].   
Securing the nation’s homeland cannot be performed by government alone.  
Eight-five percent of the US infrastructure is privately owned [15].  It requires our entire 
society to get involved: the American people, federal, state, and local governments, and 
the private sector businesses.  Homeland Security defines “State” as “any state of the 
United States, the District of Columbia, Puerto Rico, the Virgin Islands, Guam, American 
Samoa, the Commonwealth of the Northern Mariana Islands, or the trust territory of the 
Pacific Islands” and defines “local government” as “any county, city, village, town, 
district, or other political subdivision of any state, any Native American tribe or 
authorized tribal organization, or Alaska native village or organization, and includes any 
rural community or unincorporated town or village or any other public entity for which 
an application for assistance is made by a state or political subdivision thereof” [15]. 
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 The National Strategy for Homeland Security defines the following six critical 
mission areas: intelligence and warning, border and transportation security, domestic 
counterterrorism, protecting critical infrastructure, defending against catastrophic 
terrorism, and emergency preparedness and response.  The Protecting Critical 
Infrastructure and Key Assets (CI/KR) critical mission area contains the Securing of 
cyberspace initiative.  The nation’s critical infrastructures are complex and if successfully 
attacked, the effects from the attack could have far reaching damaging ripple effects 
throughout the infrastructure. 
The National Strategy to Secure Cyberspace encourages Americans to secure the 
portions of cyberspace that they own, operate, control, or interact with and identified the 
lead SSAs for each of the critical infrastructures.  The DoD is identified as the lead SSA 
for the DIB [15]. This strategy provides direction for empowering and engaging people in 
protecting the cyber domain under their jurisdiction.  As is the case for the homeland in 
general, the government cannot defend cyberspace alone: 
“The way business is transacted, government operates, and national defense is 
conducted have changed. These activities now rely on an interdependent network 
of information technology infrastructures called cyberspace. The National 
Strategy to Secure Cyberspace provides a framework for protecting this 
infrastructure that is essential to our economy, security, and way of life… 
Securing cyberspace is an extraordinarily difficult strategic challenge that 
requires a coordinated and focused effort from our entire society—the federal 
government, state and local governments, the private sector, and the American 
people” [34].    
 
Protecting the Nation’s cyberspace domain involves effort from local, Tribal, 
State, and Federal governments, the private and non-profit sectors, and the American 
people.  Figure 5 illustrates the roles and responsibilities of the American people in 
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 securing cyberspace and the five national priorities for securing cyberspace.  National 
Priority 1 focuses on improving our ability to respond to cyber incidents and reducing the 
potential damage from such incidents.  National Priorities 2, 3, and 4 are aimed at 
reducing the number of exploitable vulnerabilities thus preventing successful cyber 
attacks, and National Priority 5 seeks to prevent cyber attacks that could affect national 
security assets such as the DoD, DIB, nation’s cyberspace, and the nation’s critical 
infrastructures.   DoD, working with intelligence and law enforcement agencies, is tasked 
to attribute cyberspace attacks to ensure timely and appropriate responses to attacks.   
Roles and Responsibilities in Securing Cyberspace 
 National 
Priority 1 
National 
Priority 2 
National 
Priority 3 
National Priority 
4 
National 
Priority 5 
National 
Cyberspace 
Security 
Response 
System 
National 
Cyberspace 
Security Threat 
and 
Vulnerability 
Reduction 
System 
National 
Cyberspace 
Security 
Awareness and 
Training 
Program 
Securing 
Governments’ 
Cyberspace 
National 
Security and 
International 
Cyberspace 
Security 
Cooperation 
Home User/ 
Small 
Business 
  
X 
 
X 
  
Large 
Enterprises X X X X X 
Critical 
Sectors/ 
Infrastructures 
X X X X X 
National 
Issues and 
Vulnerabilties 
X X X X  
Global     X 
Figure 5: Cyberspace Roles and Responsibilities 
[18] 
 
The National Strategy for the Physical Protection of Critical Infrastructure and 
Key Assets provides the guiding principles for securing the critical infrastructure and 
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 addresses the protection challenge for each of the sectors.  Figure 6 illustrates the DoD 
DIB protection challenge: ~ 250,000 firms in 215 distinct industries located worldwide.  
THE PROTECTION CHALLENGE 
Agriculture and Food 1,912,000 farms;  
87,000 food-processing plants 
Water 1,800 federal reservoirs; 
1,600 municipal waste water facilities 
Public Health 5,800 registered hospitals 
Emergency Services 87,00 U.S. localities 
Defense Industrial Base 250,000 firms in 215  
distinct industries 
Telecommunications 2 billion miles of cable 
Energy
Electricity 
Oil and Natural Gas 
 
2,800 power plants 
300,000 producing sites 
Transportation
Aviation 
Passenger Rail and Railroads 
Highways, Trucking, and 
Busing 
Pipelines 
Maritime 
Mass Transit 
 
5,000 public airports 
120,000 miles of major railroads 
 
590,000 highway bridges 
 
2 million miles of pipelines 
300 inland/costal ports 
500 major urban public transit operators 
Banking and Finance 26,600 FDIC insured institutions 
Chemical Industry and 
Hazardous Materials 
66,000 chemical plants 
Postal and Shipping 137 million delivery sites 
Key Assets
National Monuments and Icons 
Nuclear Power Plants 
Dams 
Government Facilities 
 
Commercial Assets 
 
5,800 historic buildings 
 
104 commercial nuclear power plants 
80,000 dams 
3,000 government owned/operated facilities 
460 skyscrapers 
*These are approximate figures. 
 
Figure 6: United States’ Protection Challenge 
[20] 
 
 DoD cannot execute its mission without support of the Defense Industrial Base 
(DIB).  The DIB provides most of the equipment, materials, services, and weapons used 
by DoD to perform its mission as defined by the national orders, strategies, directives and 
plans. 
28 
 The National Military Strategy (NMS) of the United States of America derives its 
objectives from the NSS, NDS and the current security environment [22].  The Armed 
Forces provide homeland defense by securing strategic air, land, sea, and space access 
points to the United States and its territories.  The Armed Forces task is to fight and win 
wars, defeating a wide range of adversaries from state to non-state entities.  The Armed 
Forces must be prepared to address the following types of security environment 
challenges: (1) Traditional: state employs recognized military capabilities; (2) Irregular: 
Use of unconventional methods to counter stronger opponent; (3) Catastrophic: Use of 
Weapons of Mass Destruction or producing WMD-like effects; and (4) Disruptive: Use 
of technology to affect Critical Infrastructure and Key Resources (CI/KR): for example – 
a cyberspace attack.   
The National Response Plan (NRP) for responding to incidents of national 
significance contains an annex for responding to cyber incidents [23]. The National 
Response Plan’s Cyber Incident Annex “discusses policies, organization, actions, and 
responsibilities for a coordinated, multidisciplinary, broad-based approach to prepare 
for, respond to, and recover from cyber-related Incidents of National Significance 
impacting critical national processes and the national economy” [35]. 
As stated in the NRP Cyber Incident Annex, DoD’s core roles and responsibilities 
for securing the nation’s cyberspace and coordinating incident response are: 1) providing 
defense support to civil authorities; 2) providing intelligence and information-sharing; 3) 
assisting with law enforcement investigations; and 4) providing military operations to 
defend the homeland.  This annex also stated: “If authorized by applicable law and 
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 policy, DoD can take action to deter or defend against cyber attacks that pose a threat to 
our national security” [35].  The Cyber Incident Annex was exercised in February 2006 
(known as exercise Cyber Storm), with results published in August 2006.  The results of 
this report will be discussed in more detail in Chapter IV. 
In the NRP’s Cyber Incident Annex, DoD provides cyberspace support to DHS 
using the Joint Task Force – Global Network Operations (JTF-GNO) Computer 
Emergency Response Teams (CERT) to identify, mitigate, and if necessary, respond to 
cyber attacks.  The U.S. Strategic Command (USSTRATCOM) and JTF-GNO provide 
intelligence analysis of cyber attacks.  JTF-GNO also houses the Law 
Enforcement/Counter Intelligence Center which brings together DoD law enforcement 
and the counterintelligence organizations during a cyber incident.   
The National Infrastructure Protection Plan (NIPP) provides the unifying structure 
for integrating CI/KR protection into a single national program.  The overarching goal of 
the NIPP is to: 
“Build a safer, more secure, and more resilient America by enhancing protection of 
the Nation’s CI/KR to prevent, deter, neutralize, or mitigate the effects of deliberate 
efforts by terrorists to destroy, incapacitate, or exploit them; and to strengthen 
national preparedness, timely response, and rapid recovery in the event of an attack, 
natural disaster, or other emergency”  [28].    
 
 Figure 7 demonstrates the NIPP CI/KR protection methodology scheme: manage 
the risks by deterring the threats, mitigating the vulnerabilities, or minimizing the 
consequences associated with a terrorist attack or other incident. 
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Figure 7: NIPP CI/KR Protection Methodology Model 
[28] 
 
There are seventeen critical infrastructures identified in the NIPP; all of them rely 
on cyberspace to be operational.  Each Sector Specific Agency (SSA) works closely with 
DHS to develop Sector Specific Plans (SSPs) and with their respective sector specific 
partners to develop risk management and protective programs.   
Figure 8 illustrates the United States’ Critical Infrastructure / Key Resources 
(CI/KR) Sectors.  Looking at this breakdown of SSAs, it appears that the SSA lead 
agencies are selected based on the critical infrastructure sectors that fall within their 
purview.   It is up to each lead sector agency to coordinate within the sector and with 
other sectors that may have overlapping areas dependent on each other.  As noted earlier, 
the DoD has been designated as the lead SSA for the DIB.  DoD provided an annual SSP 
to DHS in May 2007.   
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 Sector-Specific Agency (SSA) Critical Infrastructure/Key  
Resources Sector 
Department of Agriculture1 
Department of Health and Human Services2 
Agriculture and Food 
Department of Defense3 Defense Industrial Base 
Department of Energy Energy4 
Department of Health and Human Services Public Health and Healthcare 
Department of the Interior National Monuments and Icons 
Department of the Treasury Banking and Finance 
Environmental Protection Agency Drinking Water and Water Treatment Systems 
Department of Homeland Security 
Office of Infrastructure Protection 
 
 
 
 
 
Office of Cyber Security and 
Telecommunications 
              Transportation Security Administration 
 
Transportation Security Administration, 
United States Coast Guard5 
 
Immigration and Customs Enforcement, 
Federal Protective Service 
Chemical 
Commercial Facilities 
Dams 
Emergency Services 
Commercial Nuclear Reactors, Materials, and 
Waste 
Information Technology 
Telecommunications 
Postal and Shipping 
 
Transportation Systems6 
 
 
Government Facilities 
 
1 The Department of Agriculture is responsible for agriculture and food (meat, poultry, and egg products).  
2 The Department of Health and Human Services is responsible for food other than meat, poultry, and egg products. 
3 Nothing in this plan impairs or otherwise affects the authority of the Secretary of Defense over the Department of 
Defense (DOD), including the chain of command for military forces from the President as Commander in Chief, to 
the Secretary of Defense, to the commander of military forces, or military command and control procedures. 
4 The Energy Sector includes the production, refining, storage, and distribution of oil, gas, and electric power, except 
for commercial nuclear power facilities. 
5 The U.S. Coast Guard is the SSA for the maritime transportation mode. 
6 As stated in HSPD-7, the Department of Transportation and the Department of Homeland Security will collaborate 
on all matters relating to transportation security and transportation infrastructure protection. 
Figure 8: United States’ Critical Infrastructure/Key Resources Sector 
[28] 
 
The  Defense Industrial Base (DIB) Critical Infrastructure and Key Resources 
(CI/KR) Sector Specific Plan (SSP) provides a coordinated strategy for managing risk 
within DIB critical asset locations throughout the world and describes a risk management 
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 approach and plan for the DIB.  DoD relies on the DIB to provide the capabilities to 
support and sustain DoD accomplishing its mission.  The absence or unavailability of 
some assets designated as critical DIB assets, and the products and services these assets 
produce, could cause military mission failure.  The next two tables identify the products 
and services that DIB provides to DoD. 
Table 2 lists the segment and sub-segment capabilities provided by the Defense 
Industrial Base to DoD. 
Table 2: DIB Segments and Sub-segments  
[29] 
Segments Sub-segments Segments Sub-segments 
Missile • Tactical Missile 
• Torpedo 
• Strategic Missile 
Ammunition • Bombs & Warheads 
• Cartridges & Fuses 
• Explosives 
Aircraft • Fixed Wing 
• Helicopter 
• Unmanned Aerial 
Vehicle 
Weapons • Small 
• Medium 
• Large 
Troop Support • Soldier Systems 
• Clothing & Textile 
• Subsistence/Medical 
• Smoke Obscurant 
• Nuclear, Biological, 
Chemical Systems 
Information 
Technology 
• Command, Control, 
Computers, & Intelligence 
• Information Security 
• Trainers & Simulators 
• Computer Peripherals 
Space • Launch Vehicle 
• Satellite 
Shipbuilding • Surface Ship 
• Subsurface 
Combat 
Vehicle 
• Tracked vehicle 
• Tactical vehicle 
Electronics • Electronic Warfare 
• SONAR 
• Radar 
 
Table 3 lists the commodities capabilities provided by the Defense Industrial Base 
to DoD. 
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 Table 3: DIB Commodities  
[29] 
Mechanical 
• Diesel Engines • Automotive Transmission • Nuclear Components 
• Rocket Engines • Landing Gear • Hydraulics 
• Turbine Engines • Bearings  
• Aircraft Transmission • Pumps & Compressors  
Structural 
• Forgings • Depleted Uranium Armor • Composites 
• Castings • Ceramic Armor • Precious Metals 
Electrical 
• Electrical Motors • Auxiliary Power Units • Aircraft Circuit Breakers 
• Batteries Thermal • Low Smoke Wire & Cable • Switch Gear 
Electronics 
• Optics • Digitization • Traveling Wave Tubes 
• Guidance/Control • GPS Receiver • Circuit Boards 
• Communication • Semiconductors • Software 
 
As the lead SSA for the DIB, DoD’s goals for protecting the Defense Industrial 
Base are: 1) Prevent/Delay an incident; 2) Detect a potential incident; 3) Mitigate/respond 
to incident; 4) Recover from an incident; and 5) Develop resiliency.  [29:24] 
The  Defense Industrial Base (DIB) Critical Infrastructure and Key Resources 
(CI/KR) Sector Specific Plan (SSP) focuses on steps to 1) Identify a critical asset list by 
identifying Assets, Systems, networks and Functions; 2) Assess the risk based on 
mission, human, economic and public confidence impacts, consequences, vulnerabilities, 
and threats, 3) Prioritize the critical assets on that list; 4) Perform vulnerability 
assessments on high-priority critical assets; and 5) Encourage contractors’ actions to 
remediate or mitigate adverse effects found during these assessments, as appropriate, to 
ensure continuity of business operations.   
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 DoD generated the DoD Directive 3020.40 titled Defense Critical Infrastructure 
Program (DCIP) [26].  DoD assigned the Defense Contract Management Agency 
(DCMA) as the operational lead for the DCIP as DCMA manages government contracts 
with the DIB.  DoD and DCMA focused their DCIP efforts on identifying and 
prioritizing assets, systems, networks, and functions that, if damaged, would result in 
unacceptable consequences to the DOD mission, national economic security, public 
health and safety, or public confidence.  
Achieving the Mission Assurance objective (ability to mobilize, deploy and 
sustain U. S. military operations) requires having the core capabilities in place so that 
DoD can perform its assigned duties based on having access to the defense critical 
infrastructure. The defense critical infrastructure is defined as “DoD and non-DoD cyber 
and physical assets and associated infrastructure essential to project and support 
military forces worldwide” [25].  Achieving the Mission Assurance objective requires 
ensuring the preparedness of the Defense Industrial base (DIB) and may also require 
DoD to protect DIB elements. The Defense Industrial Base is defined as “DoD, the U.S. 
Government, and the private sector worldwide industrial complex with capabilities to 
perform research and development (R&D), design, produce, deliver, and maintain 
military weapon systems, subsystems, components, or parts to meet military 
requirements”  [29]. 
The Government Accountability Office (GAO) provided a report to Congress in 
August 2007 titled “Defense Infrastructure: Management Actions Needed to Ensure 
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 Effectiveness of DOD’s Risk Management Approach for the Defense Industrial Base” 
6], which documented deficiencies in the DoD’s DIB Risk Management Approach. [3
  
Table 4, Summary of DoD’s Efforts in Identifying and Assessing Critical DIB 
Assets, provides the metrics for the current number of important and critical DIB assets 
identified and the number of contractors assessed as of 1 June 2007.   
Table 4: Summary of DOD’s Efforts in Identifying and  
Assessing Critical DIB Assets [36:12] 
 Critical Contractors 
DIB Assets Important Domestic Foreign Total 
Identified 900 194 9 203 
Assessed* 8 0 8 
*The number of contractors assessed does not include 5 that were completed prior 
to DCMA’s pilot program being established 
 
Table 5, Assessments Planned during Fiscal years 2007 to 2012, provides the 
projected metrics for performing DIB Critical Infrastructure Planning Mission Assurance 
Assessments (CIP MAA) on identified DIB assets.    
Table 5: Assessments Planned during Fiscal Years 2007 to 2012 [36:16] 
Fiscal year 2007 2008 2009 2010 2011 2012
Assessments Planned as of Nov 2006 19 50 50 50 20 20
Revised plan as of May 2007** 14 21 21 50 50 50
**DCMA is planning that after completing the initial assessments, DIB assets 
would be reassessed every three years 
 
DoD issued the Strategy for Homeland Defense and Civil Support in June 2005 
and is based on the National Defense Strategy’s active layered defense concept.   
“Homeland defense is the protection of US sovereignty, territory, domestic 
population, and critical defense infrastructure against external threats and aggression, 
or other threats as directed by the President [25].  DoD can provide civil assistance to 
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 local government under the Posse Comitatus Act if authorized by the National Command 
Authority.  The Posse Comitatus Act, 18 June 1878, limits DoD’s capabilities for 
providing military assistance to domestic law enforcement.  “Unless under authorization 
by the President, Congress, or the Constitution, Posse Comitatus, together with related 
DOD regulations, prohibits the Army, Air Force, Marine Corps, and Navy from directly 
participating in civilian law enforcement activities within the United States”  [30].  The 
Strategy for Homeland Defense and Civil Support improves the nation’s ability to 
respond to threats against the nation’s homeland [25].    
Figure 9 illustrates the strategy foundations for formulating DoD’s Strategy for 
Homeland Defense and Civil Support.   
 
Figure 9: Foundations for DoD Strategy for Homeland  
Defense and Civil Support [25] 
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 The National Security Strategy and National Strategy for Homeland Security 
provide guidance to the National Defense Strategy for defining its strategic objectives.  
The National Defense Strategy provides the guidance to the Strategy for Homeland 
Defense and Civil Support for securing the United States from direct attack. 
Figure 10 illustrates DoD’s Strategic Goals, Key Objectives, and its core 
capabilities for US Homeland Defense and Civil Support.  DoD leads military missions to 
prevent, deter, and defeat attacks on the United States.  DoD, when directed by NCA, 
provides defense support of civil authorities.  DoD enables others by sharing capabilities 
and expertise with domestic agencies and international partners. 
 
Figure 10: DoD Objectives and Core Capabilities for  
Protecting the US from Attack [25] 
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 The Strategy for Homeland Defense and Civil Support designates 
USNORTHCOM, USPACOM, and USSTRATCOM as being responsible for defending 
the nation’s homeland cyberspace infrastructure and providing civil support.   
USNORTHCOM and USPACOM conduct operations for addressing threats 
against the United States, their geographic AOR territories and their AORs’ interests. 
They are also tasked to provide military assistance to civil authorities when directed by 
the National Command Authority under the Posse Comitatus Act [37].  They will respond 
to civil support incidents when the local and state support agencies are unable to deal 
with the incidents [25].  The other regional combatant commanders have a lesser role in 
defending the nation’s homeland cyberspace since they are responsible for maintaining 
their own networks within their AOR. 
USSTRATCOM’s mission objectives are: 1) Provide the nation with global 
deterrence capabilities; 2) Synchronize DoD effects to combat adversary weapons of 
mass destruction worldwide; 3) Enable decisive global kinetic and non-kinetic combat 
effects through the application and advocacy of integrated intelligence, surveillance and 
reconnaissance (ISR); 4) Provide space and global strike operations; 5) Information 
Operations (IO); and 6) Integrated missile defense and robust command and control [38].    
One of USSTRATCOM’s component commands is the Joint Task Force – Global 
Network Operations (JTF-GNO) command.  JTF-GNO is responsible for assuring system 
and network availability, information protection, and timely information delivery using 
the Global Information Grid (GIG) across the strategic, operational, and tactical 
boundaries in support of DoD’s mission [39].  USSTRATCOM also contains the Joint 
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 Functional Component Command – Network Warfare (JFCC-NW) which “facilitates 
cooperative engagement with other national entities in computer network defense and 
network warfare as part of the global information operations mission.” [40] 
National Guard and Reserve members can be activated to serve as regular armed 
forces by presidential order under United States Code Title 10 – Armed Forces.  USC 
Title 10 – Armed Forces defines the United States military organization and its powers 
[41].  USC Title 10, Subtitle A, Part I, Chapter 18 Military Support for Civilian Law 
Enforcement Agencies provides the legal guidance for providing Armed Forces to assist 
federal, state, and local law enforcement agencies.  
National Guard forces can also be activated by a state governor to serve in time of 
a state emergency.   USC Title 32 – National Guard defines the United States National 
Guard and its powers.  Title 32, Chapter 9 (Homeland Defense Activities) provides the 
legal guidance for providing National Guard to assist in homeland defense activities [42].  
The Defense Contract Management Agency (DCMA) is using National Guard and 
Reserve Forces to perform the Critical Infrastructure Protection – Mission Assurance 
Assessments (CIP-MAAs) of the DIB sector for performing the DoD Directive 3020.40, 
Defense Critical Infrastructure Program (DCIP). 
The DoD role for securing the United States’ cyberspace is to serve as the lead 
SSA for protecting the Defense Industrial Base (DIB) critical infrastructure using risk 
management methodology.  DoD provides homeland defense and civil support if 
authorized by the National Command Authority (NCA).  DoD responds to cyber attacks 
40 
 in coordination with DHS and other agencies if the cyber attacks are deemed of national 
significance and authorized by law and policy. 
When reviewing DoD as a role model for DIB cyber security practices, one has 
only to read the latest news reports to determine that DoD has its own problems in 
securing its infrastructure from cyberspace attacks.  Andrew Palowitch, a former CIA 
official and industry consultant to the USSTRATCOM Commander stated, “America is 
under widespread attack in cyberspace,” and cited “statistics that there were 37,000 
reported breaches of government and private systems in fiscal 2007. There were nearly 
13,000 direct assaults on federal agencies then, and 80,000 attempted computer network 
attacks on Defense Department systems … Some of those assaults reduced the U.S., 
military operational capabilities” [43].    
In The National Security Strategy of the United States of America, President Bush 
reflected that “This strategy reflects our most solemn obligation: to protect the security 
of the American people” [27].  This strategy is based on two pillars.  The first pillar 
promotes freedom, democracy, justice, human dignity, and prosperity through free and 
fair trade.  The second pillar is confronting the challenges of our time by leading world-
wide efforts to address the challenges.  The challenges of our time include addressing 
disruptive security environment challenges where technology is used to affect our 
nation’s critical infrastructure and key resources (CI/KR).  DoD’s goals for defending the 
DIB critical infrastructure include addressing the disruptive security environment 
challenges. 
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 3.5. Investigative Questions  
Now that the research has reviewed the literature from Chapter II and answered 
the research question, the research moves to the investigative questions and answers them 
with the gained knowledge from reviewing the literature and answering the research 
question. 
What is DoD’s role for securing the United States homeland critical infrastructure 
from cyber attack?  
 
In the National Strategy for Homeland Security, the National Strategy to Secure 
Cyberspace and the National Infrastructure Protection Plan, DoD is identified as the lead 
Sector Specific Agency for the securing the United States cyberspace for the Defense 
Industrial Base critical infrastructure. 
In the National Response Plan’s Cyber Incident Annex, DoD entities responsible 
for computer security and computer network defense may provide defense support of 
civil authorities, provide information sharing and intelligence, assist in law-enforcement 
investigations, and provide military operations to defend the homeland.  DoD  can take 
action to deter or defend against cyber attacks that pose a threat to our national security, 
if authorized by the applicable law and policy [35].  All cyber attacks against the nation’s 
critical infrastructures/key resources that have national significance, affect the national 
security of the American people, and NCA authority to respond, can cause DoD to 
engage.   The nation’s cyberspace is under attacks around the clock, but these attacks 
typically do not require DoD intervention.  
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 One type of cyber attack could include obvious attempts to affect the well-being 
of the United States in cyberspace.  It could be as devastating as producing major 
electrical outages with cascading effects preventing people from purchasing the basic 
necessities (food & water) to lack of communications to American people. Major 
electrical outages could create chaos, and DoD could be called upon to assist in providing 
civil support to local law enforcement agencies.  Additionally, DoD could assist in 
determining attribution for the attack, and if ordered by the National Command 
Authority, could take action against the United States space cyber attacker.  Effects from 
this type of United States cyberspace attack could ripple to the Defense Industrial Base, 
preventing it from providing capabilities to DoD consisting of: missiles, aircraft, troop 
support, space capabilities, combat vehicles, ammunition, weapons, information 
technology, shipbuilding, electronics, and mechanical, structural, electrical, and 
electronic parts.  By not having these capabilities provided by the Defense Industrial 
Base, DoD cannot achieve its mission.  These capabilities provide DoD with the products 
and services necessary to equip, inform, mobilize, deploy, and sustain operations 
worldwide. 
When the terrorist physical attacks on the United States occurred on 11 September 
2001 (9/11), it was nationally devastating.  In addition to the physical destruction, there 
was a severe psychological impact.  People wanted to know how this could happen to our 
great country.  Our nation’s people experienced a great deal of concern over just being 
able to get food, water and purchasing of fuel for their vehicles.  Rumors were being 
passed around that our water supplies and oil refineries were going to be attacked.  The 
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 airline industry was in shock.  The New York Stock Exchange was non-operational for 
approximately one week, affecting our nation’s prosperity and economic well-being.  
People were afraid to attend major events that may be targeted by terrorists.  The DoD 
provided civil support and military support for homeland defense during the aftermath of 
the 9/11 incident.  This attack forced the nation to look at its own infrastructures and 
identify those critical infrastructures that were critical to the nation’s well-being.  The 
DIB was identified as a critical infrastructure and DoD was assigned to protect it as the 
lead SSA. 
What support can DoD provide to Civil Authorities to respond and recover from 
cyber attack? 
 
In the National Strategy to Secure Cyberspace, DoD, law enforcement agencies, 
and the Intelligence Community (IC) are tasked with improving the attack prevention and 
attack attribution capabilities.  In the National Response Plan’s Cyber Incident Annex, 
DoD can take action to deter or defend against cyber attacks that pose a threat to our 
national security, if authorized by the applicable law and policy [35].  DoD was 
designated as the lead agency for the Defense Industrial Base.   DoD works with over 
250,000 firms in 215 distinct industries located worldwide to protect the Defense 
Industrial Base (DIB).   DoD supports the DIB in reducing risks from cyber attacks or 
hazards by using these goals as their guideline: 1) Preventing/Delaying an incident; 2) 
Detecting a potential incident; 3) Mitigating/Responding to incident; 4) Recovering from 
Incident; and 5) Developing resiliency.  The USNORTHCOM and USPACOM can 
provide the appropriate DoD personnel to assist civil authorities in addressing the cyber 
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attacks.  The DIB critical infrastructures are responsible for their own recovery using 
Contingency Plans, Continuity of Operations, and relying on Backups. 
Can/Should the National Guard and reserve members’ roles be expanded to support 
cyberspace roles and functions? 
The National Guard and reserve members can be used and are being used by DoD 
in supporting DoD’s role as the lead sector-specific agency (SSA) for the Defense 
Industrial Base Critical Infrastructure and Key Resource (CI/KR).   National Guard 
personnel are providing Critical Infrastructure Protection (CIP) Mission Assurance 
Assessment (MAA) training for individuals who perform DIB assessments.  National 
Guard personnel are also performing the CIP-MAA at various DIB sites [44].   
3.6. Summary 
This chapter presented the methodologies used in the research to perform 
literature review and content analysis of literature relevant to this research. 
Cyberspace has existed in our work environments for over fifty years, however, 
only through technological advances have we been able to integrate cyberspace into our 
daily lives.  The last twenty years have seen the release of the first piece of malware 
software in 1988 known as the internet worm (which was fairly harmless) to more recent 
events of cyber attacks being committed on the country of Estonia [45].   
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Protecting the Nation’s cyberspace domain involves effort from local, Tribal, 
State, and Federal governments, the private and non-profit sectors, and the American 
people.   
“And so, my fellow Americans: ask not what your country can do for you--ask 
what you can do for your country.”   
(Source: Inaugural Address of President John F. Kennedy) 
 
John F. Kennedy spoke the above words during his inaugural speech on 20 
January 1961 [46].  These words apply almost fifty years later to our effort to defend and 
protect US cyberspace critical infrastructure.  Americans can take these words to heart 
and do their part in securing cyberspace (keeping their systems patched and virus 
signatures up to date are just a few ways).  We must all do our part to keep America’s 
cyberspace safe. 
DoD’s role in defending the United States’ cyberspace is diversified by serving as 
the lead sector-specific agency (SSA) for the Defense Industrial Base (DIB).  The DIB 
consists of over 250,000 firms for 215 unique industries required to support the DoD in 
accomplishing its mission.  As the lead SSA for the DIB, DoD works with the DIB in 
performing risk management. 
In Chapter IV, the research examines the results of the literature review and 
contents analysis and looks more closely at some of the results the review provided.  In 
particular, the research is looking more closely at the GAO Audit report of DoD and the 
DIB and the Cyber Storm exercise results.
  
 
IV. Results and Analysis 
4.1. Chapter Overview 
Chapter III reviewed and analyzed the literature focusing on the research and 
investigative questions.  It also introduced two additional documents generated by GAO 
and the DHS for providing insight into how DoD is performing in securing the DIB 
critical infrastructure cyberspace and for detailing the Cyber Storm Exercise performed 
by DHS with its critical infrastructure lead SSAs, private sector representatives, 
emergency responders, and some of our nation’s international partners.    
In this chapter, the research examines the recommendations and findings in the 
GAO report titled: “Defense Infrastructure: Management Actions Needed to Ensure 
Effectiveness of DoD’s Risk Management Approach for the Defense Industrial Base”, 
published August 2007 and in the DHS Cyber Storm exercise report, published 
September 2006.   The research analyzes the findings and makes observations.  The 
research then summarizes the findings at the end of this chapter. 
4.2. GAO report on DOD Risk Management Approach for DIB Analysis 
The GAO report titled: “Defense Infrastructure: Management Actions Needed to 
Ensure Effectiveness of DoD’s Risk Management Approach for the Defense Industrial 
Base” identified the following summarized findings [36:26]:  
• DOD is not including the military services’ listings of assets whose damage, 
degradation, or destruction would result in DOD-wide mission failure 
 
• DoD cannot be sure it has identified the most important and critical assets, as 
called for in the National Military Strategy.  This finding is based on how the 
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 weighting factors were selected and data determined according to subjective 
decisions and limited review, and that needed contractor-specific data were 
lacking, as was comprehensive threat information, thus undermining the 
utility of the index score for prioritizing contractors.  
 
• Scheduling and conducting assessments of critical DIB assets without regard 
for assets’ priority rankings 
 
• DoD lacks a plan for working with the Department of State and other 
appropriate agencies to identify and address potential challenges in assessing 
vulnerabilities in foreign critical DIB assets 
 
DoD’s challenge for the Defense Industrial Base is to prioritize DIB assets based 
on criticality and put processes in place to protect its cyberspace infrastructure [47].  
Cyberspace is vulnerable to attacks by anyone having access to a computer with network 
connectivity using tools available for free on the internet [48].  To prevent successful 
cyberspace attacks, one must implement cyber security layers in place to protect the data 
and maintain information superiority.  Cyber security layers include protecting the 
confidentiality, integrity, and the availability (CIA) of information, authentication, 
implementing access controls and monitoring, auditing and logging of security events, 
implementing intrusion detection and virus scanning systems, and maintaining system 
backups critical data.  The CIA Triad is only good if all three legs are secure.  If any of 
the legs fail, then the information owner is susceptible to cyberspace attacks.  In order to 
maintain Information superiority, one must be able to maintain three CIA Triad legs [49].  
Sophisticated attackers can intercept information, change the content, and pass the 
modified information off as being authentic, affecting the integrity leg of the CIA Triad. 
Sophisticated attackers can monitor information being passed in clear text and gather 
information about its target, breaking the CIA Triad leg for confidentiality.  Sophisticated 
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 attackers can perform distributed denial of service (DDOS) attacks, flooding a target’s 
systems with meaningless message traffic and making the target’s systems unavailable, 
affecting the availability leg of the CIA Triad. The methods listed above are just a few 
examples of how the CIA Triad can be broken.   
The National Strategy to Secure Cyberspace assigned DoD’s role for defending 
the United States’ cyberspace to serve as the lead Sector Specific Agency (SSA) for 
protecting the nation’s critical infrastructure asset’s Defense Industrial Base [18]. DoD 
published the DoD Directive 3020.40 (DoD, 2005) [27] incorporating the President’s 
guidance issued in Homeland Security Presidential Directive #7 (HSPD-7) [22] to serve 
as the Sector-Specific Agency (SSA) for the Defense Industrial Base.  DoD Directive 
3020.40 states the following:  
• Collaborate with all relevant Federal departments and agencies, State and 
local governments, and the private sector, including with key persons and 
entities in their infrastructure sector. 
• Conduct or facilitate vulnerability assessments of the sector. 
• Encourage risk management strategies to protect against and mitigate the 
effects of attacks against critical infrastructure and key resources. 
 
An old proverb states that “a chain is only as strong as its weakest link”.  In this 
sense, the “chain” terminology is used to represent the nation’s cyberspace critical 
infrastructures.  The Defense Industrial Base consists of over 250,000 firms spread over 
215 unique industries around the world.  Cyber infrastructure security is typically left up 
to the private sector, with voluntary participation in vulnerability assessments [50].   
DIB companies want to be competitive in the market, sometimes taking shortcuts 
to get a product or service to the market before their competitor beats them out.  All of 
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 this is done at what cost?  Typically, cyber security is added as an after-thought unless 
the contract specifically states cyber security is required.   Companies have contractual 
and legal obligations to its customers, its shareholders, and to its governing body.  In the 
midst of delivering products and services on-time and within budget, and following all 
mandated laws and guidelines, it is easy to forget about the non-mandated efforts, such as 
voluntary assessments of critical infrastructures.  Program managers juggle schedules all 
the time and experience information overload trying to get the products and services 
delivered on time and within budget.   
Sixty years ago, Dr. Norbert Weiner published the paper “Cybernetics: or Control 
and Communication in the Animal and the Machine” [51] in October 1948, and was 
considered by the American Scientist magazine at the turn of the century among the most 
“memorable and influential” works of the twentieth century.  He authored this paper after 
working for the United States on developing an automated anti-aircraft system for the 
United States, developing communications theory, leading to the development of the term 
“cybernetics”.  Dr. Wiener defined cybernetics as "the science of control and 
communication in the animal and the machine”.  In his paper, he predicted “information 
overload” conditions caused by an excess amount of traffic [52].  60 years later, we are 
still concerned with “information overload” conditions.  Information overload can 
prevent individuals from making good decisions and from maintaining information 
superiority.  Performing Risk Management with the DIB provides information overload 
conditions for the DCMA and assessment teams as the DIB consists of more than 
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 215,000 companies scattered around the world, with DIB members having unique 
characteristics. 
4.3.      DHS Cyber Storm Exercise Analysis 
Homeland Security Presidential Directive #5 (HSPD-5) [17] directed the creation 
of the National Response Plan (NRP) [23] to establish the framework for the United 
States to manage domestic incidents.  The NRP’s objective is to improve coordination 
among Federal, State, Local and tribal organizations for saving lives and protecting the 
nation.   
The NRP contains the Cyber Incident Annex that is executed when a cyber attack 
occurs against the United States’ national infrastructure that could threaten the lives, 
property, the nation’s economy or national security [35].  The NRP Cyber Incident 
Annex states the following DoD roles and responsibilities for securing cyberspace and 
coordinating incident responses: 1) Defense Support of Civil Authorities; 2) intelligence 
and information-sharing; 3) law enforcement investigations; and 4) military operations to 
defend the homeland.  If authorized by applicable law and policy, DOD can take action to 
deter or defend against cyber attacks which pose an imminent threat to national security. 
 The Department of Homeland Security’ (DHS) National Cyber Security Division 
(NCSD) executed the NRP’s first Cyber Incident Annex on 6-10 February 2006 and 
published its findings on 12 September 2006 [53].  This exercise was titled Cyber Storm 
and included over 100 public and private agencies, associations, and corporations from 
over 60 locations and 5 countries, over 30 private sector corporations, along with 
designated Federal and State governments. 
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  The Cyber Storm exercise simulated a large-scale cyber attack affecting multiple 
critical infrastructures within the Energy, IT, Transportation, and Telecommunications 
sectors.  There were 8 significant findings resulting from the exercise: 
• Interagency coordination needed to be refined such that the cyber 
community better understood when to activate federal engagement 
 
• Contingency Planning, Risk Assessment, and Roles and Responsibilities 
needed to be solidified  
 
• Correlation of Multiple Incidents Between Public and Private Sectors 
remained a challenge 
 
• Training and Exercise Program needed to be established and executed to 
ensure everyone knew the roles, policies, and procedures  
 
• Coordination Between Entities of Cyber Incidents was challenged as the 
number of incidents increased 
 
• Common Framework for Response and Information Access strengthened 
information sharing between domestic and international cyber response 
communities 
 
• Strategic Communications and Public Relations Plan must be part of the 
collaborated contingency plan 
 
• Improvement of Processes, Tools, and Technology required to enhance the 
quality, speed and coordination of response 
 
DHS, NCSD, and exercise participants incorporated lessons learned from the 
Cyber Storm 2006 exercise findings.  Plans are in place for the next exercise titled Cyber 
Storm II to occur in March 2008 [54].  It will be interesting to see the results of this next 
exercise.   
It is not clear from analyzing the report findings if the cyber exercise progressed 
to the point of authorizing by applicable law and policy DoD to take action to deter or 
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 defend against the cyber attacks which posed an imminent threat to national security.  If 
this happened, it was not detailed in the findings.  It is critical to detail the procedure for 
determining when to engage DoD to deter or defend against cyber attacks which pose an 
imminent threat to national security, and the unity of command for performing this. 
The type of Cyber attack that will impact DoD can be compared to results of the 
September 11, 2001 physical attack on the United States’ homeland which shut down all 
air and train transportation until security procedures could be put in place to monitor 
passengers, shut down the New York Stock Exchange for approximately five business 
days, and greatly impacted the Manhattan’s business district [55].   
It can also be compared to the effects of the natural disaster Hurricane Katrina in 
August 2005 which affected the United States’ Gulf coast states and rippled throughout 
the country causing gas prices to go up, among other things.   The government was not at 
its best performance when the “failure to initiate” occurred for Hurricane Katrina causing 
lives to be lost, failures in communications and the lack of following procedures to get 
the assistance from the federal government that the gulf coast states needed.  The gulf 
coast states are still reeling (over two years later) from the effects of the hurricane, but 
are slowly coming back to life [56]  
DoD’s Strategy for Homeland Defense and Civil Support (SHDCS) provides the 
guidance for DoD in performing Homeland Defense and Civil Support [25].  The 
Assistant Secretary of Defense for Homeland Defense is in charge of DoD’s homeland 
defense activities.  US Northern Command (USNORTHCOM) is responsible for 
planning, organizing, and executing homeland defense and civil support missions within 
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 the continental United States, Alaska, and territorial waters.  US Pacific Command 
(USPACOM) has homeland defense and civil support responsibilities for Hawaii and US 
territories, possessions and freely associated states. 
If directed by the President or the SECDEF of the United States, DoD can provide 
assistance to local law enforcement agencies, provide intelligence and information-
sharing to assist in characterizing the cyber attack and attributing the attack to an entity, 
assist in law enforcement operations, and perform military operations to defend the 
homeland.  DoD can take actions to deter or defend against cyber attacks which pose an 
imminent threat to national security based on applicable laws and policies. 
The National Guard’s role in providing cyber support to Civil Authorities consists 
of supporting DoD’s Critical Infrastructure Protection (CIP) role for performing CIP 
Mission Assurance Assessments (MAA) on the Defense Industrial base (DIB) 
components [57].  The DoD DCIP has collaborated with the National Guard Bureau, the 
Defense Contract Management Agency (DCMA), the West Virginia National Guard, the 
Naval Surface Warfare Center‘s (NSWC) Mission Assurance Division to develop CIP-
MAA curriculum for training DIB assessment personnel.  The DIB is cooperating with 
the National Guard members for assessing their operations. 
4.4.      Summary 
DoD’s role in defending the United States’ cyberspace is diversified by serving as 
the lead sector-specific agency (SSA) for the Defense Industrial Base (DIB).  The DIB 
consists of over 250,000 firms for 215 unique industries required to support the DoD in 
accomplishing its mission.  GAO published findings of its assessment for DoD in 
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performing risk management of the DIB and DHS published findings from its cyber 
exercise.    It is clear from reviewing these findings that there is still much work to be 
done by DoD in securing the nation’s critical infrastructures.
 V.  Conclusion 
5.1.      Discussion 
The DoD role for securing the United States cyberspace is serving as the lead 
Sector Specific Agency (SSA) for protecting the Defense Industrial Base (DIB) critical 
infrastructure’s cyberspace.  DoD can provide homeland defense and civil support if 
directed by National Command Authority, and can respond to cyber attacks of national 
significance if authorized to do so, coordinating response with DHS and other agencies.  
DoD can encourage and sometimes mandate to the DIB sector (based on the national 
security level of the DIB’s role) best practices in cyber security.  However, DoD cannot 
defend DIB’s cyberspace on its own.  Each of the DIB partners must take an active role 
in securing its own cyberspace.   
Potential adversaries are aware that the United States’ relies heavily on the 
cyberspace infrastructure to perform its DoD mission at home and abroad [58].  These 
adversaries are studying the types of cyberspace information systems and vulnerabilities 
associated with them that are being used by the US.  United States’ cyberspace is under 
constant surveillance, with malicious actors hoping to find weaknesses that can be 
exploited for gaining information superiority over our nation.  
The DoD published DoD Directive 3020.40 (DoD, 2005) [26] incorporating the 
President’s guidance issued in Homeland Security Presidential Directive 7 (HSPD-7)  
[21] to serve as the Sector-Specific Agency (SSA) for the Defense Industrial Base.   
The Directive states that DoD will do the following:  
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 • Collaborate with all relevant Federal departments and agencies, State and 
local governments, and the private sector, including with key persons and 
entities in their infrastructure sector. 
• Conduct or facilitate vulnerability assessments of the sector. 
• Encourage risk management strategies to protect against and mitigate the 
effects of attacks against critical infrastructure and key resources. 
 
An old proverb states that “a chain is only as strong as its weakest link”.  In this 
sense, the “chain” terminology represents the nation’s cyberspace critical infrastructure.  
The Defense Industrial Base consists of over 215,000 firms spread over 250 unique 
industries around the world.  Cyber infrastructure security is typically left up to the 
private sector, with voluntary participation in vulnerability assessments [59].   
System administrators, engineers, and programmers need to be responsible for 
assessing and mitigating the risks, and performing their roles responsibly and ensuring 
the CIA Triad is not broken [60].  Multi-layered cyber security mechanisms need to be in 
place so that if an adversary is able to penetrate one layer, the next layer may be the one 
to stop or delay the penetration.  DIB partners need to ensure that cyber security is one of 
the top-funded IT items.  IT professionals must keep their skills current with the 
technology [61].  Companies must provide the necessary finances for appropriate cyber 
security investments, including the training and certification of their IT staff. 
If the United States’ cyberspace were to come under attack, there is legal 
guidance [62] available for addressing the cyberspace attack.  The Law of Information 
Conflict (LOIC) is the “composite of the peacetime regime of international law, the law 
of conflict management, and the law of armed conflict that regulates the conduct of all 
state activities in cyberspace” [63].  The LOIC documents the legal options available for 
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 responding to the cyberspace attack based on the severity of the attack [64].   In the 
National Strategy to Secure Cyberspace, DoD is designated as the lead sector-specific 
agency for protecting the Defense Industrial Base critical infrastructure.  DoD 
experiences daily attacks on its own networks, yet does not resort to mounting counter 
attacks.   
The National Security Agency and the Department of Homeland Security (DHS) 
in support of the President's National Strategy to Secure Cyberspace, February 2003, 
jointly sponsor the Centers of Academic Excellence program. This program promotes 
higher Information Assurance education with the intent to grow a group of skilled 
professionals who can assist in addressing vulnerabilities in our nation’s critical 
cyberspace infrastructure. 
At this point in time, it is still being discussed as to what actions DoD should take 
to respond to a cyber attack on the nation’s critical infrastructures.  The Homeland 
Security Law Handbook discusses the conditions and steps involved for responding to 
cyberspace attacks on the nation’s infrastructure.  It is important to get these concepts 
documented clearly in DoD policy and doctrine, so that if and when a cyber attack does 
occur, DoD personnel will have the guidance necessary to respond strategically, 
tactically, and operationally.  The National Military Strategy for Cyber Operations has 
been developed and is classified. 
The DoD needs to continue working with the technology producers (hardware and 
software) for developing cyber security products that are the backbone of our nation’s 
infrastructure [65].  DoD’s role for protecting and defending the nation’s Defense 
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 Industrial Base critical infrastructure is complicated as the majority of the DIB is owned 
by the public sector, and is scattered around the world.  The technology producers need to 
be aware that their responsible development and implementation of systems could be the 
difference between life and death for our DoD forces [60].   
Holding the DIB accountable for developing and incorporating cyber security into 
those systems being used by DoD to accomplish its mission is not yet realized.  The DIB 
is contractually held accountable for delivering products and services as written into the 
contracts.  If cyber security is not written into the contract, then the nation cannot hold 
the DIB members accountable when the service or product has vulnerabilities able to be 
exploited by an adversary, thus increasing an adversary’s information superiority over the 
United States. 
5.2.      Recommendations for Future Research 
 There are several areas for research that can assist the United States in securing its 
cyberspace: (1) Attributing cyberspace entity presence to physical location; and (2) 
Mandatory DIB critical infrastructure protection participation. 
The first area of recommended future research discusses developing technology to 
attribute a user or adversary to a specific geo-physical location.  Dr. Dorothy Denning 
and Professor Peter MacDoran discussed improving computer and network security by 
using a new form of location-based authentication which has the effect of grounding 
cyberspace to a physical location thereby helping to attribute attacks to a geo-physical 
location [66]. This geo-location-based authentication system would enforce 
authentication based on authorized physical location of individual, much like the concept 
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 of calling from your home phone to activate a new credit card: the home phone number 
has to match the information in the company’s database.  This type of authentication 
system would provide the capability to track a user to a physical location.   
The second area of recommended future research would encourage the Defense 
Contract Management Agency to add language to its contracts regarding cyber security of 
the products or services being delivered.  The Defense Contract Management Agency 
(DCMA) is designated by DoD as the defense industrial base sector lead agent. DCMA 
performs worldwide acquisition life cycle contract management for Department of 
Defense weapon system programs, spares, supplies and services.  This includes ensuring 
on-time delivery, at the right cost and in accordance with performance standards 
prescribed in over 360,000 contracts valued at over $900 billion with over 25,000 
domestic and foreign contractors.   DCMA information located on the DCMA website 
(www.dcma.mil) does not indicate they have updated the contractual language to reflect 
DCIP vulnerability assessments are required for DIB members doing business with the 
government or that cyber security needs to be implemented within the company and its 
services or products [67].  It appears that vulnerability assessments are purely voluntary.  
This is an area that should require vulnerability assessments and contractual language 
requiring cyber security be built into the company’s IT systems, applicable products and 
services.  On the flip side of the coin, it is in a DIB’s best interests to be the company that 
implements cyber security into its services and products.  No company wants to be the 
one with the headlines blaring “Company loses corporate and personal information to 
hacker, losses are estimated to be in millions” or “Company’s IT system failure causes 
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 loss of life on war field”.  Imagine the confidence level of the stockholders when that 
happens, affecting directly the economic well-being of the company. 
5.3.      Conclusion 
DoD’s role for securing United States cyberspace is to serve as the lead Sector 
Specific Agency (SSA) for the Defense Industrial Base (DIB).  The DIB provides DoD 
with the capabilities (missiles, aircraft, troop support, space, combat vehicles, 
ammunition, weapons, information technology, shipbuilding, electronics, and 
mechanical, structural, electrical, and electronic parts) to perform its mission.  These 
capabilities provide DoD with the products and services necessary to equip, inform, 
mobilize, deploy, and sustain operations worldwide.  DoD relies on the DIB to meet 
requirements to fulfill the National Military Strategy. 
It is voluntary for the DIB to work with DoD in performing critical infrastructure 
protection mission assurance assessments (CIP-MAA).  The DIB is not obligated to 
comply with the CIP-MAA.  DoD can make the DIB aware of potential threats, but it is 
up to the DIB to manage the risks by deterring the threats, mitigating the vulnerabilities, 
and minimizing the consequences.  A risk assumed by one is a risk assumed by all. 
If directed by the President or the SecDef of the United States, DoD can provide 
assistance to local law enforcement agencies, provide intelligence and information-
sharing to assist in characterizing the cyber attack and attributing the attack to an entity, 
assist in law enforcement operations, and perform military operations to defend the 
homeland.  DoD can take actions to deter or defend against cyber attacks which pose an 
imminent threat to national security based on applicable laws and policies. 
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DoD’s challenge for securing the Defense Industrial Base critical infrastructure is 
to put processes in place to protect its cyberspace infrastructure by identifying and 
prioritizing critical assets and performing risk management [68].  Cyber security is all 
about the people, the processes, and the technology.  Educating our people (users, 
managers, technicians, engineers, scientists, programmers) in their associated disciplines, 
improving on the processes for maintaining a secure cyberspace infrastructure, and 
improving the technology (building cyber security into hardware and software) contribute 
to improving cyberspace security.  Cyberspace security cannot be achieved without all 
three of these factors (people, processes, and technology) taken into consideration.  
Information superiority cannot be achieved without cyber security. 
The threats still exist for an adversary to physically attack the United States, but a 
skilled cyberspace adversary could strike at the heart of America’s homeland with little 
cost, without ever leaving the comforts of home and retain anonymity. Our reliance on 
the power and capabilities of these ITs, which may contain vulnerabilities exploitable by 
an adversary, could ultimately be our weakness, our Achilles Heel.  
 
 
 Appendix A. Acronym List 
 
9/11   11 September 2001 
ASD   Assistant Secretary of Defense 
CCDR   Combatant Commander 
CIA   Confidentiality, Integrity, Availability 
CI/KR   Critical Infrastructure and Key Resources 
CJCS   Chairman of Joint Chiefs of Staff 
CIP   Critical Infrastructure Protection 
DCIP   Defense Critical Infrastructure Program 
DCMA  Defense Contract Management Agency 
DDOS   Distributed Denial of Service 
DHS   Department of Homeland Security 
DIB   Defense Industrial Base 
DIME   Diplomatic, Information, Military, and Economic 
DII   Defense Information Infrastructure 
DoD   Department of Defense 
EO   Executive Order 
F2T2EA  Find, Fix, Track, Target, Engage, Assess 
GAO   Government Accountability Office 
GIG   Global Information Grid 
HSPD   Homeland Security Presidential Directive 
IP   Internet Protocol 
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 IS   Information Systems 
IT   Information Technology 
JCS   Joint Chiefs of Staff 
JFCC-NW  Joint Functional Component Command – Network Warfare 
JTF-GNO  Joint Task Force – Global Network Operations 
MAA   Mission Assurance Assessment 
NCA   National Command Authority 
NDS   National Defense Strategy 
NII   National Information Infrastructure 
NIPP   National Infrastructure Protection Plan 
NIST   National Institute of Standards and Technology 
NMS   National Military Strategy 
NMS-CO  National Military Strategy for Cyber Operations 
NORAD  North American Aerospace Defense 
NPPD   National Protection and Programs Directorate 
NRP   National Response Plan 
NSA   National Security Agency 
NSPD    National Security Presidential Directive 
NSS   National Security Strategy 
OBE   Overcome By Events 
OODA   Observe, Orient, Decide, Act 
OSD   Office of Secretary of Defense 
SECDEF  Secretary of Defense 
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SSA   Sector Specific Agency 
SSP   Sector Specific Plan 
UC   Unified Command 
U.S.   United States  
US   United States 
USC   United States Code 
USCENTCOM United States Central Command 
USEUCOM  United States Europe Command 
USJFCOM  United States Joint Forces Command 
USNORTHCOM  United States Northern Command 
USPACOM  United States Pacific Command 
USSOCOM  United States Special Operations Command 
USSOUTHCOM United States South Command 
USSTRATCOM United States Strategic Command 
USTRANSCOM United States Transportation Command 
VOIP   Voice Over Internet Protocol 
 
 
 Appendix B. Terms and Definitions  
 
Achilles Heel - a fatal weakness that leads or may lead to a downfall. (Cyber Warfare and 
Cyber Terrorism, pg 33).  
 
Asset (Infrastructure) - A distinguishable network entity that provides a service or 
capability. Assets are people, physical entities, or information located either within or 
outside the United States and owned or operated by domestic, foreign, public, or private 
sector organizations. (DoDD 3020.40) 
 
Botnet - A network of remote-controlled zombie computers.  Using Trojan Horse 
programs or worms/viruses, a person (often called a "botmaster" or "herder") can inject 
malware into a user's computer which opens a port to listen for commands; often via an 
internet relay chat (IRC) channel. When the commands are received then the zombie 
computer (as they are called) executes its instructions which often involve sending out 
massive amounts of spam, copies of other malware, or popup advertising. The user of the 
zombie may not even be aware this is happening unless they notice a slowdown of their 
computer or a large amount of Internet activity. (Computer Knowledge) 
 
Characterization (Infrastructure) - The analytic decomposition of functions, systems, 
assets, and dependencies as they relate to supporting DoD operational capabilities and 
assets. (DoDD 3020.40) 
 
CIA Triad – An information security model that requires that these three key principles 
be implemented to secure systems: Confidentiality, Integrity, and Availability. 
Confidentiality prevents unauthorized disclosure of sensitive information.  Integrity 
ensures that data is an accurate and unchanged representation of the original secured 
information.  Availability is having reliable and timely access to the data and resources 
you are authorized to use. (CISSP) 
 
Critical Asset - A specific entity that is of such extraordinary importance that its 
incapacitation or destruction would have a very serious, debilitating effect on the ability 
of a nation to continue to function effectively. (JP3-07.2) 
 
Critical Infrastructure – Assets, systems and networks, whether physical or virtual, so 
vital to the United States that the incapacity or destruction of such assets, systems, or 
networks would have a debilitating impact on security, national economic security, 
national public health or safety, or any combination of those matters. (NIPP) 
 
Critical Infrastructure Protection - Actions taken to prevent, remediate, or mitigate the 
risks resulting from vulnerabilities of critical infrastructure assets. Depending on the risk, 
these actions could include: changes in tactics, techniques, or procedures; adding 
redundancy; selection of another asset; isolation or hardening; guarding, etc.  (JP3-28) 
 
Cybersecurity – See Information Security. 
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Cyberspace – a domain characterized by the use of electronics and the electromagnetic 
spectrum to store, modify, and exchange data via networked systems and associated 
infrastructures. (NMS-CO) 
 
Cyberspace - the interdependent network of information technology infrastructures, and 
includes the Internet, telecommunications networks, computer systems, and embedded 
processors and controllers in critical industries.  (NSPD-54/HSPD-23) 
 
Cyber Storm Exercise - The National Cyber Exercise (NCE) Cyber Storm was executed 
successfully on February 6–10, 2006. The United States (U.S.) Department of Homeland 
Security (DHS)/National Cyber Security Division (NCSD) was responsible for 
developing, implementing, and coordinating all aspects of Cyber Storm. The first 
Government-led, full-scale, cyber security exercise of its kind, Cyber Storm was a 
coordinated effort between international, Federal and State governments, and private 
sector organizations to exercise their response, coordination, and recovery mechanisms in 
reaction to simulated cyber events. Cyber Storm provided participants with a controlled 
environment in which to exercise a coordinated cyber incident response, including 
information sharing mechanisms, procedures for establishing situational awareness, 
public and private organizational decision making, and public communications during a 
cyber-related Incident of National Significance.  Over 100 public and private agencies, 
associations, and corporations participated in the exercise from over 60 locations and 5 
countries. They collaborated in crisis response at operational, policy and public affairs 
levels in this federally funded and congressionally mandated emergency response 
exercise. The exercise included participation of more than 30 private sector corporations 
and associations in its planning, execution, and after action analysis. The exercise 
scenario simulated a large-scale cyber campaign affecting or disrupting multiple critical 
infrastructure elements primarily within the Energy, Information Technology, 
Transportation, and Telecommunications Sectors. The exercise was conducted primarily 
on a separate exercise network without impacting real world information systems. (DHS 
Cyber Storm Exercise Report – September 2006) 
 
Defense Critical Asset - An asset of such extraordinary importance to DoD operations in 
peace, crisis, and war that its incapacitation or destruction would have a very serious, 
debilitating effect on the ability of the Department of Defense to fulfill its missions. 
(DoDD 3020.40) 
 
Defense Critical Infrastructure - DoD and non-DoD cyber and physical assets and 
associated infrastructure essential to project and support military forces worldwide.  
(DoDD 3020.40) 
 
Defense Critical Infrastructure - the DOD and non-DOD networked assets essential to 
project, support, and sustain military forces and operations worldwide. Assets are people, 
physical entities, or information. Physical assets would include installations, facilities, 
ports, bridges, power stations, telecommunication lines, pipelines, etc. The increasing 
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 interconnectivity and interdependence among commercial and defense infrastructures 
demand that DOD take steps to understand and remedy or mitigate the vulnerabilities of, 
and threats to, the critical infrastructures on which it depends for mission 
accomplishment. (JP3-27) 
 
Defense Critical Infrastructure Program (DCIP) - A DoD risk management program that 
seeks to ensure the availability of networked assets critical to DoD missions. Activities 
include the identification, assessment, and security enhancement of assets essential for 
executing the National Military Strategy.  (DoDD 3020.40)  
 
Defense Critical Infrastructure Program (DCIP) - The DCIP is a fully integrated program 
that provides a comprehensive process for understanding and protecting selected 
infrastructure assets that are critical to national security during peace, crisis, and war. It 
involves identifying, prioritizing, assessing, protecting, monitoring, and assuring the 
reliability and availability of mission-critical infrastructures essential to the execution of 
the NMS. The program also addresses the operational decision support necessary for 
CCDRs to achieve their mission objectives despite the degradation or absence of these 
infrastructures. (JP3-27) 
 
Defense Industrial Base (DIB) - The Department of Defense, government, and private 
sector worldwide industrial complex with capabilities to perform research and 
development, design, produce, and maintain military weapon systems, subsystems, 
components, or parts to meet military requirements. (JP 3-27) 
 
Defense Industrial Base (DIB) Defense Sector - The Department of Defense, the U.S. 
Government, and private sector worldwide industrial complex with capabilities to 
perform research and development, design, produce, and maintain military weapon 
systems, subsystems, components, or parts to meet military requirements. (DIB-SSP) 
 
Defense Information Infrastructure - The shared or interconnected system of computers, 
communications, data applications, security, people, training, and other support structures 
serving Department of Defense (DOD) local, national, and worldwide information needs. 
The defense information infrastructure connects DOD mission support, command and 
control, and intelligence computers through voice, telecom-munications, imagery, video, 
and multimedia services. It provides information processing and services to subscribers 
over the Defense Information Systems Network and includes command and control, 
tactical, intelligence, and commercial communications systems used to transmit DOD 
information. Also called DII. (JP 3-13) 
 
Defense Information Systems Network - Integrated network, centrally managed and 
configured to provide long-haul information transfer services for all Department of 
Defense activities. It is an information transfer utility designed to provide dedicated 
point-to-point, switched voice and data, imagery, and video teleconferencing services. 
Also called DISN. (JP 2-01) 
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 Defense Sector - A virtual association within the DCIP that traverses normal 
organizational boundaries, encompasses defense networks, assets, and associated 
dependencies,that perform similar functions within the Department of Defense and are 
essential to the execution of the National Military Strategy. (DoDD 3020.40) 
 
Defense Support of Civil Authorities — Civil support provided under the auspices of the 
National Response Plan. Also called DSCA. (JP 3-28) 
 
Defense support of civil authorities – often referred to as civil support, is DoD support, 
including Federal military forces, the Department’s career civilian and contractor 
personnel, and DoD agency and component assets, for domestic emergencies and for 
designated law enforcement and other activities. The Department of Defense provides 
defense support of civil authorities when directed to do so by the President or Secretary 
of Defense. (DoD Strategy for Homeland Defense and Civil Support) 
 
Department of Defense components - The Office of the Secretary of Defense, the 
Military Departments, the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, the combatant 
commands, the Office of the Inspector General of the Department of Defense, the 
Department of Defense agencies, field activities, and all other organizational entities in 
the Department of Defense. (JP 1) 
 
Dependency - A relationship or connection whereby one entity is influenced or controlled 
by another entity. (Dodd 3020.40) 
 
Diplomatic, Information, Military and Economic (DIME) - Areas of national power that 
are leveraged in "effects-based" operations against an adversary's vulnerabilities 
identified by Operational Net Assessment, and targeted against his will and capability to 
conduct war. (USJFCOM Glossary) 
 
Distributed Denial of Service -  An attack sent by an individual or individuals which can 
be set up to be sent automatically by programs known as Zombies that may have been 
installed in various computers in advance of the attack. With Zombies, all the attacker 
need do is send a single command and they perform the attack. This method can more 
easily isolate the attacker from those who might want to find him/her as the attack itself is 
coming from completely unrelated computers that may be half a world away. These 
DDoS attacks may even use your computer through a zombie installed by a worm. 
(Computer Knowledge) 
 
Electromagnetic Spectrum - The range of frequencies of electromagnetic radiation from 
zero to infinity. It is divided into 26 alphabetically designated bands. (JP1-02) 
Emergency Response Providers - includes Federal, State, and local emergency public 
safety, law enforcement, emergency response, emergency medical (including hospital 
emergency facilities), and related personnel, agencies, and authorities. 
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 Financial Services Defense Sector -  The DoD, government, and private sector worldwide 
network and its supporting infrastructure that meet the financial services needs of DoD 
users across the range of military operations. (DoDD 3020.40) 
 
Global Information Grid - The globally interconnected, end-to-end set of information 
capabilities, associated processes and personnel for collecting, processing, storing, 
disseminating, and managing information on demand to warfighters, policy makers, and 
support personnel. The Global Information Grid includes owned and leased 
communications and computing systems and services, software (including applications), 
data, security services, other associated services and National Security Systems. Also 
called GIG. (JP 6-0) 
 
Global Information Grid (GIG) Defense Sector - The globally interconnected, end-to-end 
set of information capabilities, associated processes, and personnel for collecting, 
processing, storing, disseminating, and managing information on demand to warfighters, 
policy makers, and support personnel including all owned and leased communications 
and computing systems and services, software (including applications), data, security 
services, and other associated services necessary to achieve information superiority. It 
also includes National Security Systems as defined in Section 5142 of the Clinger-Cohen 
Act of 1996 (reference (g)). (DoDD 3020.40) 
 
Global Information Infrastructure - The worldwide interconnection of communications 
networks, computers, databases, and consumer electronics that make vast amounts of 
information available to users. The global information infrastructure encompasses a wide 
range of equipment, including cameras, scanners, keyboards, facsimile machines, 
computers, switches, compact disks, video and audio tape, cable, wire, satellites, fiber-
optic transmission lines, networks of all types, televisions, monitors, printers, and much 
more. The friendly and adversary personnel who make decisions and handle the 
transmitted information constitute a critical component of the global information 
infrastructure. Also called GII. (JP 3-13) 
 
Global Positioning System - A satellite constellation that provides highly accurate 
position,velocity, and time navigation information to users. Also called GPS. (JP1-02) 
 
Hazard (Infrastructure) - Non-hostile incidents such as accidents, natural forces, 
technological failure, etc., that cause loss or damage to infrastructure assets. (DoDD 
3020.40) 
 
Health Affairs Defense Sector - The DoD, government and private sector worldwide 
health care network and its supporting infrastructure that meet the health care needs of 
DoD users across the range of military operations. (DoDD 3020.40) 
 
Homeland — The physical region that includes the continental United States, Alaska, 
Hawaii, United States possessions and territories, and surrounding territorial waters and 
airspace. (JP 3-28) 
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Homeland Defense — The protection of United States sovereignty, territory, domestic 
population, and critical defense infrastructure against external threats and aggression or 
other threats as directed by the President. The DoD is responsible for Homeland Defense.  
Also called HD. (JP 3-27) 
 
Information - 1. Facts, data, or instructions in any medium or form. 2. The meaning that a 
human assigns to data by means of the known conventions used in their representation. 
(JP 3-13.1) 
 
Information Management — The function of managing an organization’s information 
resources by the handling of knowledge acquired by one or many different individuals 
and organizations in a way that optimizes access by all who have a share in that 
knowledge or a right to that knowledge. (JP 3-0) 
 
Information Operations — The integrated employment of the core capabilities of 
electronic warfare, computer network operations, psychological operations, military 
deception, and operations security, in concert with specified supporting and related 
capabilities, to influence, disrupt, corrupt or usurp adversarial human and automated 
decision making while protecting our own. Also called IO.  (JP 3-13) 
 
Information Security — The protection of information and information systems against 
unauthorized access or modification of information, whether in storage, processing, or 
transit, and against denial of service to authorized users. Also called INFOSEC.  
(JP 3-13) 
 
Information Superiority — The operational advantage derived from the ability to collect, 
process, and disseminate an uninterrupted flow of information while exploiting or 
denying an adversary’s ability to do the same. (JP 3-13) 
 
Information System — The entire infrastructure, organization, personnel, and 
components for the collection, processing, storage, transmission, display, dissemination, 
and disposition of information. (JP 3-13) 
 
Infrastructure - The framework of networked assets that comprise identifiable industries, 
institutions, or distribution capabilities that enable a continued flow of goods and 
services. (DoDD 3020.40) 
 
Installation Preparedness. - The integration of key activities on DoD installations and 
facilities that address all efforts pertaining to prevention, detection, protection, response, 
and remediation against all threats and hazards. (DoDD 3020.40) 
 
Intelligence, Surveillance, and Reconnaissance (ISR) Defense Sector - The DoD, 
government and private sector worldwide facilities, networks, and systems that conduct 
and support the collection, production, and dissemination of intelligence, surveillance and 
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 reconnaissance information, in support of activities that meet the needs of DoD users 
across the range of military operations. (DoDD 3020.40) 
 
Inter-Dependency - Relationships or connections between entities of different functions, 
networks, sectors, or services. (DoDD 3020.40) 
 
Intra-Dependency - Relationships or connections between entities within a common 
function, network, sector, or service. (DoDD 3020.40) 
 
Local Government - any county, city, village, town, district, or other political subdivision 
of any state, any Native American tribe or authorized tribal organization, or Alaska native 
village or organization, and includes any rural community or unincorporated town or 
village or any other public entity for which an application for assistance is made by a 
state or political subdivision thereof. (National Strategy for Homeland Security) 
 
Logistics Defense Sector. The DoD, government, and private sector worldwide facilities, 
networks, and systems that support the provision of supplies and services to U.S. forces. 
(DoDD 3020.40) 
 
Military Support to Civil Authorities — A mission of civil support consisting of support 
for natural or man-made disasters, chemical, biological, radiological, nuclear, or high-
yield explosive consequence management, and other support as required. Also called 
MSCA. (DODD 3025.1) 
 
Military Support to Civilian Law Enforcement Agencies — A mission of civil support 
that includes support to civilian law enforcement agencies. This includes but is not 
limited to: combating terrorism, counterdrug operations, national security special events, 
and national critical infrastructure and key asset protection. Also called MSCLEA. 
(DODD 3025.1) 
 
Mission Assurance - A process to ensure that assigned tasks or duties can be performed 
in accordance with the intended purpose or plan. It is a summation of the activities and 
measures taken to ensure that required capabilities and all supporting infrastructures are 
available to the DoD to carry out the National Military Strategy. It links numerous risk 
management program activities and security related functions—such as force protection; 
antiterrorism; critical infrastructure protection; information assurance; continuity of 
operations; chemical, biological, radiological, nuclear, and high-explosive defense; 
readiness; and installation preparedness—to create the synergistic effect required for 
DoD to mobilize, deploy, support, and sustain military operations throughout the 
continuum of operations. (DoDD 3020.40) 
 
Mitigation - Actions taken in response to a warning or after an incident occurs that are 
intended to lessen the potentially adverse effects on a given military operation or 
infrastructure. (DoDD 3020.40) 
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 Monitoring and Reporting - The collection, fusion, and dissemination of intelligence 
based indications and warning, DoD asset and civil infrastructure readiness reporting, law 
enforcement information, man-made or natural hazards, and suspicious security event 
reporting, that can adversely impact mission readiness. (DoDD 3020.40) 
 
National Command Authority - The President of the United States or the Secretary of 
Defense ability to exercise authority and control of the Armed Forces. (JP-1) 
 
National Critical Infrastructure and Key Assets — The infrastructure and assets vital to a 
nation’s security, governance, public health and safety, economy, and public confidence. 
They include telecommunications, electrical power systems, gas and oil distribution and 
storage, water supply systems, banking and finance, transportation, emergency services, 
industrial assets, information systems, and continuity of government operations. Also 
called NCI&KA. (JP 3-28) 
 
National Defense Strategy — A document approved by the Secretary of Defense for 
applying the Armed Forces of the United States in coordination with Department of 
Defense agencies and other instruments of national power to achieve national security 
strategy objectives. Also called NDS. (JP 3-0) 
 
National Emergency — A condition declared by the President or the Congress by virtue 
of powers previously vested in them that authorize certain emergency actions to be 
undertaken in the national interest. Action to be taken may include partial, full, or total 
mobilization of national resources. (JP 3-28) 
 
National Incident Management System — A national crisis response system that provides 
a consistent, nationwide approach for Federal, state, local, and tribal governments; the 
private sector; and nongovernmental organizations to work effectively and efficiently 
together to prepare for, respond to, and recover from domestic incidents, regardless of 
cause, size, or complexity. Also called NIMS. (JP 3-41) 
 
National Information Infrastructure — The nationwide interconnection of 
communications networks, computers, databases, and consumer electronics that make 
vast amounts of information available to users. The national information infrastructure 
encompasses a wide range of equipment, including cameras, scanners, keyboards, 
facsimile machines, computers, switches, compact disks, video and audio tape, cable, 
wire, satellites, fiber-optic transmission lines, networks of all types, televisions, monitors, 
printers, and much more. The friendly and adversary personnel who make decisions and 
handle the transmitted information constitute a critical component of the national 
information infrastructure. Also called NII. (JP 3-13) 
 
National Military Strategy — A document approved by the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs 
of Staff for distributing and applying military power to attain national security strategy 
and national defense strategy objectives. Also called NMS.  (JP 3-0) 
 
73 
 National Operations Center — The primary national hub for domestic incident 
management operational coordination and situational awareness. A standing 24 hours a 
day, 7 days a week interagency organization fusing law enforcement, national 
intelligence, emergency response, and private-sector reporting. Also called NOC. (JP 3-
28) 
 
National Response Coordination Center — A multiagency center that provides overall 
federal response and recovery coordination for incidents of national significance and 
emergency management program implementation. This center is a functional component 
of the national operations center. Also called NRCC. (JP 3-28) 
 
National Security — A collective term encompassing both national defense and foreign 
relations of the United States. Specifically, the condition provided by: a. a military or 
defense advantage over any foreign nation or group of nations; b. a favorable foreign 
relations position; or c. a defense posture capable of successfully resisting hostile or 
destructive action from within or without, overt or covert. (JP1-02) 
 
National Security Council — A governmental body specifically designed to assist the 
President in integrating all spheres of national security policy. The President, Vice 
President, Secretary of State, and Secretary of Defense are statutory members. The 
Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff; Director, Central Intelligence Agency; and the 
Assistant to the President for National Security Affairs serve as advisers. Also called 
NSC.  (JP1-02) 
 
National Security Interests — The foundation for the development of valid national 
objectives that define US goals or purposes. National security interests include preserving 
US political identity, framework, and institutions; fostering economic well-being; and 
bolstering international order supporting the vital interests of the United States and its 
allies.  (JP1-02) 
 
National Security Strategy - A document approved by the President of the United States 
for developing, applying, and coordinating the instruments of national power to achieve 
objectives that contribute to national security. Also called NSS. (JP 3-0) 
 
Network - A group or system of interconnected or cooperating entities, normally 
characterized as being nodes (assets) and the connections that link them.  (DoDD 
3020.40) 
 
North American Aerospace Defense Command — A bi-national command of the US and 
Canada that provides aerospace surveillance, warning and assessment of aerospace 
attack, and maintains the sovereignty of US and Canadian airspace. Also called NORAD. 
(JP1-02) 
 
Operational Net Assessment (ONA) - A continuously updated operational support tool 
that provides a JTF commander visibility of effects-to-task linkages based on a "system-
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 of-systems" analysis of a potential adversary's political, military, economic, social, 
infrastructure, and information (PMESII) war-making capabilities. The ONA informs 
decision-makers from strategic to tactical levels regarding the complementary effects and 
supporting missions and tasks that can be considered when applying the full range of 
diplomatic, information, military and economic (DIME) actions to achieve specific 
effects on an adversary's will and capability in support of national objectives. ONA is a 
critical enabler for achieving rapid decisive operations. It is an integrated, collaborative 
product of Department of Defense and other appropriate government and non-
government organizations. Its purpose is to identify key links and nodes within the 
adversary's systems and to propose methods that will influence, neutralize or destroy 
them and achieve a desired effect or outcome. (USJFCOM Glossary) 
 
Personnel Defense Sector - The DoD, government, and private sector worldwide network 
that coordinates and supports personnel and human resource functions of DoD personnel. 
(DoDD 3020.40) 
 
Posse Comitatus Act — Prohibits search, seizure, or arrest powers to US military 
personnel. Amended in 1981 under Public Law 97-86 to permit increased Department of 
Defense support of drug interdiction and other law enforcement activities. (Title 18, “Use 
of Army and Air Force as Posse Comitatus” - United States Code, Section 1385) (JP1-02) 
 
Protect – reducing the vulnerability of critical infrastructure or key resources in order to 
deter, mitigate, or neutralize terrorist attacks. 
 
Public Works Defense Sector - The DoD, government, and private sector worldwide 
network, including the real property inventories (environment, land, buildings, and 
utilities), that manages the support, generation, production, and transport of commodities 
(e.g., electric power, oil and natural gas, water and sewer, emergency services, etc.) for 
and to DoD users.  (DoDD 3020.40) 
 
Remediation - Actions taken to correct known deficiencies and weaknesses. These 
actions are undertaken once a vulnerability has been identified.  (DoDD 3020.40) 
 
Reserve Components - Reserve Components of the Armed Forces of the United States 
are: a.the Army National Guard of the United States; b. the Army Reserve; c. the Naval 
Reserve; d. the Marine Corps Reserve; e. the Air National Guard of the United States; f. 
the Air Force Reserve; and g. the Coast Guard Reserve. Also called RCs. (JP 4-05) 
 
Risk - Probability and severity of loss linked to threats or hazards. (DoDD 3020.40) 
 
Risk Assessment – is a systematic examination of risk, using disciplined processes, 
methods, and tools. It provides an environment for decision making to continuously 
evaluate and prioritize risks and recommend strategies to remediate or mitigate those 
risks. (DoDD 3020.40) 
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Risk Management - A process by which decision makers accept, reduce, or offset risk. 
(DoDD 3020.40) 
 
Sector-Specific Agency – federal department or agency responsible for infrastructure 
protection activities in a designated critical infrastructure sector or key resources 
category. 
 
Secure – reducing the vulnerability of critical infrastructure or key resources in order to 
deter, mitigate, or neutralize terrorist attacks. 
 
Space Defense Sector - The DoD, government, and private sector worldwide network, 
including both space- and ground-based systems and facilities, that supports launch, 
operation, maintenance, specialized logistics, control systems, etc., for DoD users. 
 
State - any state of the United States, the District of Columbia, Puerto Rico, the Virgin 
Islands, Guam, American Samoa, the Canal Zone, the Commonwealth of the Northern 
Mariana Islands, or the trust territory of the Pacific Islands. (National Strategy for 
Homeland Security) 
 
Strategy - A prudent idea or set of ideas for employing the instruments of national power 
in a synchronized and integrated fashion to achieve theater, national, and/or multinational 
objectives. (JP 3-0) 
 
Theater Strategy - Concepts and courses of action directed toward securing the objectives 
of national and multinational policies and strategies through the synchronized and 
integrated employment of military forces and other instruments of national power.  
(JP 3-0) 
 
Threat - An adversary having the intent, capability, and opportunity to cause loss or 
damage. (DoDD 3020.40) 
 
Transportation Defense Sector - The DoD, government, and private sector worldwide 
network that provides U.S. military lift support (surface, sea, and air) for military 
operations. (DoDD 3020.40) 
 
Vulnerability (Infrastructure) - The characteristics of an installation, system, asset, 
application, or its dependencies that could cause it to suffer a degradation or loss 
(incapacity to perform its designated function) as a result of having been subjected to a 
certain level of threat or hazard.  (DoDD 3020.40) 
 
Vulnerability Assessment (Infrastructure) - A systematic examination of the 
characteristics of an installation, system, asset, application, or its dependencies to identify 
vulnerabilities. (DoDD 3020.40) 
  
Bibliography 
 
1. Greenemeier, Larry. “Estonian ‘Cyber Riot’ Was Planned, But Mastermind Still A 
Mystery,” Information Week, 3 August 2007.  http://www.informationweek.com/ 
security/showArticle.jhtml?articleID=201202784. Accessed 6 February 2008. 
2. Computer Knowledge. “Botnet,” 11 March 2006. http://www.cknow.com/ckinfo/b/ 
Botnet-Anetworkofremote-c.html. Accessed 1 June 2007 
3. Landler, Mark and Markoff, John. “Digital Fears Emerge After Data Siege in Estonia,” 
New York Times, 29 May 2007. http://www.nytimes.com/2007/05/29/technology/ 
29estonia.html. Accessed 1 June 2007. 
 
4. Claburn, Thomas. “Estonian Hacker Fined For Cyber Attack,” Information Week, 25 
January 2008. http://www.informationweek.com/security/showArticle.jhtml?articleID 
=205918839. Accessed 6 February 2008. 
 
5. Internet World Stats Usage and Population Statistics. 30 November 2007. Estonia. 
http://www.internetworldstats.com/stats9.htm#eu. Accessed 23 January 2008. 
6. Internet World Stats Usage and Population Statistics. 30 November 2007. United 
States. http://www.internetworldstats.com/stats14.htm#north.  Accessed 23 January 
2008. 
 
7. Rice, Condoleeza.  Remarks by Condoleeza Rice at Partnership For Critical 
Infrastructure Annual Meeting.  Washington, D.C.  22 March 2001. 
 
8. Kass, Lani Dr. “Cyberspace: A Warfighting Domain,” HQ USAF, AF Cyberspace 
Task Force, 26 September 2006.http://www.afa.org/media/scripts/ppt_pdf/AFACyber 
spaceTaskForceBrief.pdf  Accessed 6 February 2008. 
 
9. United States House of Representatives. A Failure of Initiative Final Report of the 
Select Bipartisan Committee to Investigate the Preparation for and Response to 
Hurricane Katrina. 15 February 2006. Washington D.C.: Government Printing 
Office, 2006.  http://www.gpoaccess.gov/katrinareport/mainreport.pdf.  Accessed 7 
January 2008. 
 
10.  Department of Defense. National Military Strategy for Cyber Operations (NMS-CO).  
Washington D.C.: Government Printing Office, 2007. 
11. Colonels Qiao Liang and Wang Xiangsui, Peoples Liberation Army (PLA). Chinese 
IW Doctrine “Unrestricted Warfare”, February 1999. 
77 
 12.  The White House.  National Security Act of 1947, http://www.whitehouse.gov/nsc/. 
(Accessed 28 November 2007) 
13.  The White House.  Executive Order 13231 – Critical Information Protection in 
Information Age, October 2001.  http://www.whitehouse.gov/nsc/. (Accessed 28 
November 2007) 
14.  United States Code Title 50 - War and National Defense.  
http://uscode.house.gov/download/title_50.shtml (Accessed 28 November 2007) 
15. The White House. The National Strategy for Homeland Security. Washington D.C.: 
Government Printing Office, 2002. 
16. The White House. Homeland Security Act of 2002. Washington D.C.: Government 
Printing Office, 2002. 
17.  The White House.  HSPD-5 Management of Domestic Incidents. Washington D.C.: 
Government Printing Office, 2003. 
18. The White House. The National Strategy to Secure Cyberspace. Washington D.C.: 
Government Printing Office, 2003. 
19. The White House. National Strategy for Homeland Security. Washington D.C.: 
Government Printing Office, 2002. 
20. The White House. The National Strategy for the Physical Protection of Critical 
Infrastructures and Key Assets. Washington D.C.: Government Printing Office, 2003.  
21. The White House.  HSPD-7 Critical Infrastructure Identification, Prioritization, and 
Protection.  Washington D.C.: Government Printing Office, 2003. 
22. The White House. The National Military Strategy of the United States of America. 
Washington D.C.: Government Printing Office, 2004. 
23. Department of Homeland Security.  National Response Plan. Washington D.C.: 
Government Printing Office, 2004. 
24. The White House. The National Defense Strategy of the United States of America. 
Washington D.C.: Government Printing Office, 2005. 
78 
 25.  Department of Defense.  Strategy for Homeland Defense and Civil Support.  
Washington D.C.: Government Printing Office, 2005. 
26.  Department of Defense.  DoD Directive 3020.40 Defense Critical Infrastructure 
Program.  Washington D.C.: Government Printing Office, 2005. 
27.  The White House.  The National Security Strategy of the United States of America. 
Washington D.C.: Government Printing Office, 2006.  
28. Department of Homeland Security. The National Infrastructure Protection Plan. 
Washington D.C.: Government Printing Office, 2006. 
29.  Department of Homeland Security and Department of Defense.  Defense Industrial 
Base Critical Infrastructure and Key Resources Sector-Specific Plan as input to the 
National Infrastructure Protection Plan. Washington D.C.: Government Printing 
Office, 2007.  
30.  Department of Defense.  Joint Publication 1, Doctrine for the Armed Forces of the 
United States (JP1).  Washington D.C.: Government Printing Office, 2007. pxiv. 
31.  Department of Defense.  Joint Publication 3-27, Homeland Security (JP3-27).  
Washington D.C.: Government Printing Office, 2007. 
32.  Department of Homeland Security.  DHS Organization Chart.  www.dhs.gov/ 
xlibrary/assets/DHS_OrgChart.pdf.  Accessed 23 January 2008. 
33. Shanor, Charles A.  and Hogue, L. Lynn.  National Security and Military Law.  
Thomson West, 2003.   
34. The White House. President Bush’s Letter to the American People for The National 
Strategy to Secure Cyberspace. Washington D.C.: Government Printing Office, 2003. 
35. Department of Homeland Security.  National Response Plan, Cyber Incident Annex. 
Washington D.C.: Government Printing Office, 2004. 
36.  United States Government Accountability Office.  “Defense Infrastructure: 
Management Actions Needed to Ensure Effectiveness of DoD’s Risk Management 
Approach for the Defense Industrial Base.” GAO-07-1077.  Washington D.C. August 
2007. www.gao.gov/cgi-bin/getrpt?GAO-07-1077.  Accessed 6 February 2008. 
37.  Department of Defense.  Joint Publication 3-28, Civil Support (JP3-28).  
Washington D.C.: Government Printing Office, 2007. 
79 
 38. United States Strategic Command. USSTRATCOM Mission Statement.  
http://www.stratcom.mil/ Accessed 7 January 2008. 
39. United States Strategic Command.  JTF-GNO Mission Statement.  
http://www.stratcom.mil/fact_sheets/fact_jtf_gno.html  Accessed 7 January 2008. 
40. United States Strategic Command.  USSTRATCOM Functional Components.  
http://www.stratcom.mil/organization-fnc_comp.html   Accessed 7 January 2008. 
41.  United States Code Title - 10 Armed Forces. 
http://www.access.gpo.gov/uscode/title10/title10.html (Accessed 27 November 2007) 
42.  United States Code Title 32 - National Guard. 
http://www.access.gpo.gov/uscode/title32/title32.html (Accessed 27 November 2007) 
43. Posner, Michael. “America Already is in a Cyber War, Analyst Says,” National 
Journal’s Technology Daily.   27 November 2007. http://www.govexec.com/ 
story_page.cfm?articleid=38667.  Accessed 6 February 2008. 
 
44.  The CIP Report.  “Defense Industrial Base.”  Critical Infrastructure Protection 
Program, Volume 5 Number 8. George Mason University, School of Law.  Zeichner 
Risk Analytics, LLC (ZRA). February 2007. 
45.  Howard, John D.  “An Analysis Of Security Incidents On The Internet,” Carnegie 
Mellon University Thesis April 7, 1997.  http://www.cert.org/research/JHThesis/ 
Accessed 1 October 2007. 
46. The White House. Inaugural Address of President John F. Kennedy, 20 January 
1961. http://www.jfklibrary.org/Historical+Resources/Archives/Reference+Desk/ 
      Speeches/JFK/003POF03Inaugural01201961.htm  Accessed 7 January 2008. 
47. Panagiotis Kanellis, Evangelos Kiountouzis, Nicholas Kolokotronis, and Drakoulis 
Martakos.  “Digital crime and Forensic Science.”  Idea Group Publishing, 2006. Pg 
244 
48. Kurose, Jim and Ross, Keith.  “Computer Networking: A Top Down Approach 
Featuring the Internet, 3rd edition.”  Addison-Wesley, July 2004. 
49. Bishop, Matt.  “Computer Security: Art and Science.”  Addison-Wesley, 2002. 
50.  ABS Consulting.  Homeland Security Law Handbook.  Government Institutes, 2003. 
80 
 51. Weiner, Norbert.  Cybernetics: or Control and Communication in the Animal and the 
Machine.  Cambridge, MA: MIT Press.  1948 
52. Conway, Flo and Siegelman, Jim.  “Dark Hero Of The Information Age: In Search Of 
Norbert Weiner The Father Of Cybernetics.”  Basic Books, 2004.  pp171-194. 
53. Department of Homeland Security.  Cyber Storm Exercise Report. Washington D.C.: 
Government Printing Office, 2006. 
54. Department of Homeland Security.  Cyber Storm II National Cyber Exercise for 
March 2008. Washington D.C.: Government Printing Office, 2007. 
55. Report for Congress.  The Economic Effects of 9/11: A Retrospective Assessment.  
Washington D.C.: Government Printing Office, 2002. 
56. Whoriskey, Peter.  Biloxi’s Recovery Shows Divide While Casinos Prosper, 
Katrina’s Mark Lingers in Working-Class Areas.  Washington Post, 25 November 
2007; Page A03.  http://www.washingtonpost.com/wp-dyn/content/article/2007/ 
11/24/AR2007112400616.html?sub=AR  (Accessed 7 February 2008) 
57. The CIP Report.  “Defense Industrial Base.”  Critical Infrastructure Protection 
Program, Volume 5 Number 8. George Mason University, School of Law.  Zeichner 
Risk Analytics, LLC (ZRA). February 2007. 
58.  Thomas, Timothy L.  Dragon Bytes: Chinese Information – War Theory and Practice 
from 1995 – 2003.  Foreign Military Studies Office: Fort Leavenworth, KS, 2004. Pg-
87. 
59. ABS Consulting.  Homeland Security Law Handbook.  Government Institutes, 2003. 
60. Baase, Sara.  A Gift of Fire: Social, Legal, and Ethical Issues for Computers and the 
Internet, 2nd edition.  Prentice Hall, 2003. 
61. Galliers, Robert D. and Leidner, Dorothy E.  Strategic Information Management: 
Challenges and Strategies in Managing Information Systems, third edition.  Elsevier 
Butterworth-Heinemann, 2003. 
62. Wingfield, Thomas C.  The Law of Information Conflict: National Security Law in 
Cyberspace.  Aegis Research Corporation, 2000a.   
63. Wingfield, Thomas C.  The Law of Information Conflict: National Security Law in 
Cyberspace.  Aegis Research Corporation, 2000a.  pp10-11 
81 
 64. Wingfield, Thomas C.  The Law of Information Conflict: National Security Law in 
Cyberspace.  Aegis Research Corporation, 2000b.  pp123-129 
65. Rattray, Greg.  Strategic Warfare in Cyberspace.  Cambridge, MA: MIT Press 2001.  
pp 461-480. 
66. Denning, Dorothy E. and Denning, Peter J.  Internet Besieged: Countering 
Cyberspace Scofflaws.  Addison-Wesley, 1998. pp167-174. 
67.  Defense Contract Management Agency.  http://www.dcma.mil/aboutDCMA.htm 
Accessed on 7 Jan 2008. 
68. Kanellis, Panagiotis and Kiountouzis, Evangelos and Kolokotronis, Nicholas  and 
Martakos, Drakoulis.  “Digital Crime and Forensic Science.”  Idea Group Publishing, 
2006.  
 
82 
 Additional Materials Reviewed But Not Referenced 
ASD-NII/CIO.  ASD-NII/CIO.  http://www.defenselink.mil/cio-nii/ Accessed 10 
February 2008. 
Col John A. Warden III, “Air Theory for the Twenty-first Century”, Battlefield of the 
Future, 21st Century Warfare Issues, September 1995, http://www.airpower.maxwell. 
af.mil/airchronicles/battle/chp4.html (accessed 1 June 07) 
Denise Pappalardo.  “Top 10 IT Priorities at the DoD”, 13 April 2007, Network World, 
www.networkworld.com/news/2007/041307-it-priorities-dod.html.  (Accessed 4 
December 2007) 
Department of Defense.  Joint Publication 1-02, Department of Defense Dictionary of 
Military and Associated Terms (JP1-02).  Washington D.C.: Government Printing 
Office, 2007. 
Department of Defense.  Joint Publication 3-0, Joint Operations (JP3-0).  Washington 
D.C.: Government Printing Office, 2006. 
Department of Defense.  Joint Publication 3-13, Information Operations (JP3-13).  
Washington D.C.: Government Printing Office, 2006. 
Department of Defense.  Joint Publication 3-13.1, Electronic Warfare (JP3-13.1).  
Washington D.C.: Government Printing Office, 2007. 
Department of Defense.  Joint Publication 3-26, Homeland Security (JP3-26).  
Washington D.C.: Government Printing Office, 2005. 
Department of Defense.  Joint Publication 3-41, Chemical, Biological, Radiological, 
Nuclear, and High-Yield Explosives Consequence Management (JP3-41).  
Washington D.C.: Government Printing Office, 2006. 
Department of Defense.  Joint Publication 4-05, Joint Mobilization Planning (JP4-05).  
Washington D.C.: Government Printing Office, 2006. 
Department of Defense.  Joint Publication 4-05.1, Joint Tactics, Techniques, and 
Procedures for Manpower Mobilization and Demobilization Operations: Reserve 
Component (RC) Callup (JP4-05.1).  Washington D.C.: Government Printing Office, 
1998. 
83 
 Department of Defense.  Joint Publication 6-0, Joint Communications System (JP6-0).  
Washington D.C.: Government Printing Office, 2006. 
Department of Defense.  DoD Directive 5100.20 The National Security Agency and the 
Central Security Service.  Washington D.C.: Government Printing Office, 1991. 
Department of Defense.  DoD Directive 5105.19 Defense Information Systems Agency.  
Washington D.C.: Government Printing Office, 2006. 
Department of Defense.  DoD Directive 5144.1 Assistant Secretary of Defense for 
Networks and Information Integration/ DoD Chief Information Officer 
(ASD(NII)/DoD CIO).  Washington D.C.: Government Printing Office, 2005. 
Department of the Air Force. “Compliance with the Law of Armed Conflict”. Air Force 
Policy Directive (AFPD) 51-4.Washington:HQ USAF. 26 April 1993. 
Lawrence Berkeley National Laboratory, “The Electromagnetic Spectrum,” 
http://www.lbl.gov/MicroWorlds/ALSTool/EMSpec/EMSpec2.html (accessed 1 June 
2007). 
Lt Gen Bob Elder, Commander, 8AF, “Air Force Cyber Operations Command Mission: 
Warfighting”, 5 January 2007. 
Major Gary Cornn, “Cyberspace: Mission and Challenges”, 2 October 2006, AF 
Cybertask Force (accessed May 2007) 
MSgt Mitch Gettle, “Air Force Releases New Mission Statement,” Air Force Print News, 
8 December 2005, Air Force Link, http://www.af.mil/news/story.asp?id= 123013440 
Accessed 1 May 2007 
SSgt C. Todd Lopez, “8th Air Force To Become New Cyber Command,” Air Force Print 
News, 3 November 2006, Air Force Link, http://www.af.mil/news/story.asp?id 
=123030505 Accessed 1 May 2007 
SSgt C. Todd Lopez, “Fighting in Cyberspace Means Cyber Dominance,” Air Force Print 
News, 28 February 2007, Air Force Link, http://www.af.mil/news/story.asp?id= 
123042670 (accessed 1 May 2007). 
United States Department of Homeland Security, “Portfolios: Critical Infrastructure 
Protection,” 6 September 2006, 
http://www.dhs.gov/xres/programs/editorial_0548.shtm (accessed 24 May 2007). 
84 
 85 
White House.  NSPD-54/HSPD-23.  Washington D.C.: Government Printing Office, 
2008. 
Winther, Mark.  “White Paper Tier 1 ISPs: What They Are and Why They Are 
Important,” IDC, May 2006, Sponsored by NTT Communications, 
http://www.ntt.net/english/library/pdf/IDCTier1-Whitepaper.pdf (accessed 1 May 
2007). 
 
  
Vita 
 
Mrs. Jane Griffin graduated from Meigs High School located in Pomeroy, Ohio in 
1973.  Jane enlisted in the United States Navy (USN) and served on active duty from 
October 1973 to February 1981.  Jane separated from the USN with an Honorable 
Discharge as a First Class Petty-Officer (E-6) Data Systems Technician in Philadelphia, 
PA.  Jane completed an Associate in Applied Science (AAS) in Data Processing and 
graduated from Delaware County Community College Media, PA in January 1982.  She 
then worked as a computer programmer from January 1982 to January 1985 at Computer 
Sciences Corporation (CSC) in Moorestown, NJ, maintaining and developing software 
for use aboard USN AEGIS-class ships.   
While working full-time, Jane attended Saint Joseph’s University evening college 
in Philadelphia, PA and completed a Bachelor of Science (BS) in Information Systems in 
May 1984.  Jane resigned her position with CSC in January 1985 in order to attend Saint 
Joseph’s University graduate school full-time.  She completed a Master in Business 
Administration (MBA) with an emphasis on Information Systems in May 1986. 
Jane returned to Ohio the summer of 1986.  Jane accepted a computer 
programming position at Sinclair Community College in January 1987, resigning her 
position in February 1988 to advance her career at SofTech, Inc.  Note: SofTech, Inc. was 
acquired by CACI, Inc in ~1995.  Jane worked as a computer programmer on several 
USN projects from February 1988 to June 1998 and performed Independent Verification 
and Validation (IV&V) Year 2000 (Y2K) testing of United States Air Force applications 
from June 1998 to January 2000.  Jane resigned in January 2000 from CACI, Inc to 
86 
 87 
accept a civil service position with the National Air & Space Intelligence Center 
(NASIC) at WPAFB to perform Information Assurance duties.   
Jane has worked at NASIC since January 2000.  In June 2006, Jane was selected 
by the National Security Agency (NSA) Department of Defense (DoD) Information 
Assurance scholarship program to attend Air Force Institute of Technology (AFIT) to 
complete an 18-month Master of Science (MS) program in Cyber Operations from 
September 2006 to March 2008. 
Upon graduating from AFIT, Jane returned to NASIC with the intent to further 
grow the existing Information Assurance Office.
  
REPORT DOCUMENTATION PAGE 
Form Approved 
OMB No. 074-0188 
The public reporting burden for this collection of information is estimated to average 1 hour per response, including the time for reviewing instructions, searching existing data 
sources, gathering and maintaining the data needed, and completing and reviewing the collection of information.  Send comments regarding this burden estimate or any other 
aspect of the collection of information, including suggestions for reducing this burden to Department of Defense, Washington Headquarters Services, Directorate for Information 
Operations and Reports (0704-0188), 1215 Jefferson Davis Highway, Suite 1204, Arlington, VA  22202-4302.  Respondents should be aware that notwithstanding any other 
provision of law, no person shall be subject to an penalty for failing to comply with a collection of information if it does not display a currently valid OMB control number.   
PLEASE DO NOT RETURN YOUR FORM TO THE ABOVE ADDRESS. 
1. REPORT DATE (DD-MM-YYYY) 
27-03-2008 
2. REPORT TYPE  
Master’s Thesis  
3. DATES COVERED (From – To) 
October 2007 – March 2008 
4.  TITLE AND SUBTITLE 
 
DOD ROLE FOR SECURING UNITED STATES 
CYBERSPACE 
 
5a.  CONTRACT NUMBER 
5b.  GRANT NUMBER 
 
5c.  PROGRAM ELEMENT NUMBER 
6.  AUTHOR(S) 
 
Griffin, Jane J., GG-13, DAF 
 
 
 
5d.  PROJECT NUMBER 
JON # 08-159 
5e.  TASK NUMBER 
5f.  WORK UNIT NUMBER 
7. PERFORMING ORGANIZATION NAMES(S) AND ADDRESS(S) 
  Air Force Institute of Technology 
 Graduate School of Engineering and Management (AFIT/EN) 
 2950 Hobson Way, Building 640 
 WPAFB OH 45433-7765 
8. PERFORMING ORGANIZATION 
    REPORT NUMBER 
 
     AFIT/GCO/ENG/08-03 
9.  SPONSORING/MONITORING AGENCY NAME(S) AND ADDRESS(ES) 
Mr. Robert Kaufman 
Director, Information Operations 
AFIOC/IO 
Lackland AFB, TX  78243-7038 
email: robert.kaufman@lackland.af.mil  phone:  DSN 969-5377 
10. SPONSOR/MONITOR’S 
ACRONYM(S) 
 
11.  SPONSOR/MONITOR’S REPORT 
NUMBER(S) 
12. DISTRIBUTION/AVAILABILITY STATEMENT 
       
        APPROVED FOR PUBLIC RELEASE; DISTRIBUTION UNLIMITED. 
 
13. SUPPLEMENTARY NOTES  
 
 
14. ABSTRACT  
The cyber attacks on Estonia in late April and the early weeks of May 2007 significantly crippled the country, preventing it from performing 
banking, communications, news reporting, government transactions and command and control activities.   Estonia is considered a “Wired 
Society”, much like the United States.  Both countries rely on the cyberspace infrastructure economically and politically.  Estonia sought 
assistance outside the country to recover from and to address the attacks. The cyber attacks on Estonia focused world-wide attention on the effects 
that cyberspace attacks could have on countries.  If a cyber attack of national significance occurred against the United States, what would the 
United States do?  The Department of Defense is responsible for protecting the nation and its geographical boundaries from attack, but what is 
DoD’s role for securing the United States’ cyberspace?  Research was conducted by studying national orders, strategies, policies plans, and 
doctrine to determine DoD’s role for securing the United States’ cyberspace.  Research revealed that DoD is assigned the lead role as Sector 
Specific Agency (SSA) for the Defense Industrial Base (DIB).  As the lead SSA for the DIB, DoD’s role for securing the United States’ 
cyberspace is to identify, assess, and improve risk management of the critical infrastructure within the DIB.  Our nation’s defense and military 
strength rely on the DoD which in turn relies on the DIB to enable DoD to perform its mission.  Participation by the DIB is on a voluntary basis, 
with DIB participants making the risk management calls and implementing the strategies that best fit their needs, which may not serve national 
security objectives. 
 
15. SUBJECT TERMS 
 Defense Industrial Base, Securing United States Cyberspace, Cyber Storm Exercise, Risk Management, DIB, 
Critical Infrastructure, Critical Infrastructure Protection Mission Assurance Assessment, DCIP, DoD Role 
16. SECURITY CLASSIFICATION 
OF: 
17. LIMITATION   
OF ABSTRACT 
 
 
UU 
18.NUMBER  
     OF 
     PAGES 
 
98 
19a.  NAME OF RESPONSIBLE PERSON 
Robert F. Mills, PhD 
a. 
REPORT 
 
U 
b. 
ABSTRACT 
 
U 
c. THIS 
PAGE 
 
U 
19b.  TELEPHONE NUMBER (Include area code) 
(937) 255-3636, ext 4527 
(robert.mills@afit.edu)
   Standard Form 298 (Rev. 8-98) 
Prescribed by ANSI Std. Z39-18
  
 
